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ABSTRACT 
A jury simulation paradigm was employed in this series of studies exploring hate 
crime. In the first two studies., crim~ label (i.e., bias-motivated assault ·vs. first degree 
assault) and v>.tim gender were varied within the context of a sexual orientation 
motivated (study 1) or gender motivated (study 2) hate crime scenario. Results from the 
first study indicated that attributions of blame against the victim varied as a function of 
participants' attitudes toward minority sexual orientation. Results of study two indicated 
that participants in the assault condition were more likely to nnd the defendant guilty 
. . ' ' 
than those in tlw hate crime condition .. Participant!~ in study 1.wo also made differential 
attributions of victim blame depending on cdme 1abeC such that those inthe assault 
· condition found the victim to be more mentally unstable and they also found the 
defcndai1t to be mote reasonable than those in the hate crime condition. 
Jurors in the thJrd study read a trnnscript depicting an attack on a gay man by a 
man in either a local bar (i.e., not a gay bar) or a gay bar. Within location conditions, 
jurors were presented with either "provocation" by the victim (i.e., c.~kjng the perpetrator 
to dance and putting his arm around him) or alternatively no ''provocation" wos 
presented .. Results of study three 1ndicated significant differences of victim blame 
depending upon condition. Participants in the local bar and "provocation~' µresent 
co.nditions were more likely to blame the victim for the attack than those in the gay bar or 
"provocation" absent conditions. Implications for hate crime law and attribution theory 




Hate crimes have been the topic of nmch debate among political, psychological 
nnd legal schotars. Arguments about determining a biased intent, policing the right of 
people to feel ho\\' they wish, and measuring a hypothetical constmct uuch as "hate" have 
. all been arguments against the use of hate crime lavvs. Arguments Jor establishing such 
statutes are rclatc<l to the nature of what hate crimes cntaiJ and tl1e nc·~cssity to have 
harsher penalties in piace for perpetrators of such crime. 
A hate crime can be defined as one in which the victim is sc1ected because of his 
or her actual or perceived race, color~ religion, disability, sexual orientation, or national 
origin (U.S. Department of Justice, 1990); Hate crimes differ from other crimes in that 
they typically involve excessive violence, are committed against strangers, are often not . 
planned1 are typically comrnitted by young, white males, and may involve more than one 
offender (Do\vney & Stage, 1999). As a result of the 1990 Hate Crime Statistics Ac1 
(U.S. Department of Jmtice, 1990), state and federal agencies began collecting data en 
the number and type of hate crimes that were bdng committed. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) reported a dramatic im;rease in the 
number of reported hate crimes in the year following the stat~stics act (FBI, '2001 \ 
Although the :mmber of overall crimes increm .. cd slightly behveen 2000 and ~,jv}, hate 
crimes rose from a total of 8,063 in 2000 to 9,730 in 2001 (FBI, 2001). Since the FBJ · 
began collecting hate crime statistics in J 991, repotied hate crimes based on sexual 
orientation more than tripled. In the FBI's rnost recent hate crim(~S statistic report, hate 
crimes based on sexual orientation remain in the top three ot'allthc reported hate crimes 
categorics.(FBI,2001). Because crimes based on sexual orientation are underreported due 
to fear (Herek, 1989), these shr~istics may not adequately represent the breadth of biased 
crimes based on se/\.ual orientation. 
Follmving obtained re~ults of collected datR on bias-motivated crime, hate crime 
. sentencing enhancement was put into place (Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act, 
1993). Sentence enhancement w~s viewed as necessary due to the characteristlcs of hate· 
crimes thatwere identified. That is, hate crimes although typically committed agriin3t 
one person are directed at the group to which th.··. ~ ·'-"rson is perceived ~ belonging to, 
having negative implications then not only for eac1' individual victim of such crimes bui 
for their commu11ity a11Cl society as a Whol,~ by creating; fear among members oftarectcci 
groups. 
Although a number of states now include hate crime legal statutes, some still 
exclude particular groups from protection under these laws. The state of Minnesota is 
· one of ten st.ates (plus the District of Columbia) to include specific hate crin._e laws based 
on sexual orientation and gender identity (National Gay and Lesbian Ta1,k Force, 2005). 
Because of the nature of hate crimes (i.e., excessive violence, hate for gronp directed at 
one group member), it is not surprising that they have a lasting impact on the victimswho 
have exi.,erie1.1ced such a crim\! (Herek, 1994). 
Attitudes Toward Hate Crime Laws 
Numerous objections to hate crime statutes advanced by psychologists and legal 
scllo1ars have been the ba~is for much debate over hate crime laws. Gcrstenteld ( 1992) 
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argued th{\,t the impact ot' hate crirrw law ls only u :.;yrnho1ie uU·~mpt at reducing btgotry. 
· She noted tLat the trn.:~j<H' problem~ v1ith this type of 'cgblation are the diffi',;·:ilties 
surrou.;:,.ding the identification of these crimes, as well as the challenges of considering Li-ie 
0ffender's motives. That is, although the collection of information on :mte crimes b now 
required, it is still difficult, if not impossible to identify why '.l perpetrntDr commits a 
crime. Although the crime may tie called "hate," there arc a number of 'Jtht.:i' reu~ons the 
perpetrators of such crimes may be ct1mmitting them. Fear, ignorance, misunderstanding, 
ang<3ror hate m'1y all be motivatic:r. for a person to commit a crime against c.nother. Bias-
motivated cfonc (i .c., hntc crime) however tends to br, directed at a group of people cvcP 
though an individual is targeted. There are m,my situational variables that may play r. 
ro]e in an attack on an in ... ~1vidual (i.e., they may be perceived as belonging to a ~ocial 
group ir: ,1 :i.mmbc:r of ways). It is in these cases that teasing apart what constitutes hate 
crime from other types of crime becomes diffi,:.ult. Beyond situational fr~tors, 
inccnsistr-mt ways of col:~r.ting, reporting~ and analyzing data betvveen federal~ st.ate and 
local law enforcement make the label of bias-motivated crime (hate crime) seem more 
figurative than literal. 
GuHaway (?.004) discnssed the n.wny objections both psychology and legal 
scholars have to hate crime law. WbHe some are based in constitutional law (i.e., it is 
uncon~titu.tional to regulate how someone thinks or feels about someone else), others 
concern meas11rement of motivation and intent. Furthen11ore, although an inciividunl may 
he motivated to commit a clime, he or she may have no intent to do so; and even if she or 
he had intent to commit a crime, he or she may not nctually follow through. 'fh(refore 
distinctions between these constructs (:.c., motival·ion and intent) and the culpable 
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behavior Gf cl"in1inals bccr)mc difficult 11) identify. Tho:;c ·who criticizchnt0 crime law 
from a psycto!ogical perspective a!',_;ue that they ace flawed b~1.jause of th<.: itnpossibility 
to 1~1ensure bias. In this sense therefore\ the rclatj01rnhip betwrx~n attitude:~ and behavior 
cannot br; stated as causal. Crimi!1al law, however, tends to draw a line between 
motivation and intent (mens rea), intent being rnore closely tied to behavior. In the 
instance of hate crimes, however, i+ becomes difficult to tease them apart (Sullaway, 
':.004). 
Despite these concerns, SuHaway (2004) hrg1-1ed that bias-motivated assault~ as a 
fom1 of criminal activity~ does serve the purpose of reducing such crimes as ·well as 
increasing awareness of the unacceptability of such bd1aviors. Noaethclcss, PetrosinD 
( 1999) argued that hate crimes will become more difficult to prevent and wiJl occur more 
frequently. Despite this, it may be the case that simply giving these acts the crimi.1al 
labd of bias-motivated crime (i.e., hate crime) may not 0·111 serve to increase awareness 
about the unacceptability of such behavior, but may also lead to reduction in biaming the 
victim and therefore increase convictions for these types ofcrime. 
Jacobs and Potter ( 1998) discussed yet other areas of debate over hate crime laws. 
including justification and enforcement of these· 1aws. They outlined the reasons hate 
crime offenders are viewed by psychvio.~y and legal scholars as "more culpable." These 
reasons include the disproportionate severity of t~::>e types of attacks, both phys1caily 
a11d psychologically, on their victims and the impact ot hate crimes on third parties (i.e.~ 
reinforcing social division and hatred). Jacobs 2nd Potter ( 1998) a!so identified probl~ms 
with enforcing hate crirhe laws, including Jack of inforrnation in the area of jury research. 
In fact~ it has been noted that only 9% to 16% of reported hate crime acts end in arrest, 
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wit Leven fewer being prosecuted (Jacobs & Potter, 1998). Ignorance ahout the reasons 
why an al lcgcd hate crim~ perpetrator may be arrested but not prosccute<l only augments 
these sma!l numbers of prosecutions. Because little re~carch has been done in the arc:;tof 
juror deeision-making, very little is known about why fact-finders (i.e., judges and jurors) 
reach the decisions they are reaching and what factors within the trial have an influence 
on these decisions. 
Perceptions of Hate Crimes 
Hate crimes represent a distinct type of crim,~ unlike other types ofcriminal 
activity. Because they are primarily bas~d on the victim's membership in a demographic 
group, the motivation behind perpetration of such a crime may not only be different than 
that of other crimes, but may be perceived differently by other:-, as well. Indeed, 
perceptions of hate crimes appear to vary according to not only the type of crime 
involved but extra-legal factors such as race and gender as well. 
In m1 effort to understand how people view hate crimes, Craig and Waldo ( 1996) 
explored the definitions of such crime:s by asking young adults to describe their 
perceptions of what a typical hate cjme consisted of They found that participants 
viewed a typical hate crime as involving violence or assault, including a member of a 
minority group, and as being m.otivated by fear, anger or ignorance. Although these 
views are accurate, other assumptions participants stated in this study were not. 
F&i.icipants were able to point out what encapsulates a typical hate crime but did not 
identify other types of hate crime nor did they correctly state that the victims in these 
types of crimes were innocent. In other words~ participants viewed the victims as at least 
partially responsible for their victimization. It appeurs then that certain crin:1es mHy fo.il 
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to be defined as a "hate crime~ on the basis of failing to fit. notions of i.vhat typical ~ate 
crimes mvoJve. 
To further expl'-)rc ptrccptions of hate crime~ Craig a.nd Waldo ( J 906) also asked 
about perceptions of punishment for perpetrators of hate crimes. They found that 
participants rated the likelihood of punishment for hate crimes motivated by heterosexism 
to be less than hate crimes motivated by other prejudices (i.e.~ anti-Semitism, racism). 
Participants viewed hate crimes based on sexual orientation as less Ukelyto be punished, 
arguably because of a socially accepted prejudice against homosexua1ity. 
Furthermore, Dunbar and Molina (2004) found that college student participants 
had a generally positive attitude toward hate crime laws (i.e., were in favor of such laws 
being in place in the state in which they lived). Nonetheless, it may be that such positive 
attitudes extend to only certain types of hate crime. In one of the few jury simulation 
studies examining hate crimes, perceptions.of hate crime (assessed by certainty of guilt) 
varied as a function of the race of the victim and perpetrator (Marcus.;.Newhall~ Blake & 
Baumarm, 2002). Results indicated that certainty of guilt was highest when the victim 
\\:as African American and the perpetrator was Caucasian. It may be the case that 
certainty of guilt reflected the stere,)typical nature of this crime (i.e.,. certain scenarios 
more easily fit the typical idea of a hate crime than other scenarios). 
Differential perceptions of such crimes may have an impact on juror decision-
making in the courtroom. Consistent ·with this, Johnson and Byers (2003) found that the 
major factor detennining acceptance or rejection of general hate crime laws was wheth~r 
or not sexual orientation would be inciuded as a protected bias. They reported that those 
. who wanted inclusion of protection for gay men and lesbians would support such a la'N in 
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their stutc~ while thos<.': who did not want incJu~:don would oppose such a law. Clearly 
then, attitudes toward lesbians and gay men may play an important role in perceptions of 
lmte crime. 
Attitudes Toward Lesbians, Gay :M.cn, and Bisexuals 
Lesbians and gay men have a long history of persecution and have been consistent 
targets ofpr~jvdice, stereotypes, and discrimination (Yang, 1997). Many researchers 
have looked at the negative attitudes endorsed by heterosexual men and women toward 
gay men and lesbians. Overall, Kite and \Vhitley (1994) found that both heterosexual 
men and women held negative attitudes toward homosexual men and wom~n. 
Hcterose:< uo 1 men however were more negative than women toward gay men, lesbians 
and hornm;cxual behavior. These findings remained consistent in follow-up studies with 
the added finding that gay men were rated more negatively than lesbians hy both 
heterosexual men and women (LaMar & Kite, 1998). LaMar & Kite (1998) explained 
this finding in terms of a generalized gender-role belief. They stated th.at men are 
expected to hold a stronger rejection of sex-role violations whereas women are allowed 
greater latitude with sex-role violations. Therefore, social stereotypes may dictate a 
stronger acceptance of icsbians than of gay men. 
Whitley (2001) reported similar findings of negative at1itudes toward gay men 
and lesbians; pointing out that the best predictors of these attitudes were gender (i.e., 
males held more negative attitudes than females), endorsement of gender rale norms, 
negative attitudes 'toward wornc·1, anG sexist hcliefs. Herek (] 989) pointed out that 
although other types of hate crime victims (i.e.~ raciaJ; ethnic, religious) suffer from 
similar prejudkes, the impect of overt discrimination and intolerance is unique to gay 
7 
people as government, religious and soda! institutions ofo:.'.n condone pr\;"judiccs held 
against them. For example~ denying gay men at1d lesbian:. Lhc right to marry and hearing . 
certain religious groups state that homosextmHty is a sin sends the message to the general 
pubHc that discrimination against this pruiicular group is; ::t some level, acceptable. 
Moreover, these condoned negative attitudes risk being aci.cd upon in the form of 
physical aggression (D' Augelli, 1989). 
Hie impact of sexual-,orientation based hate crimes on the victims of these crimes 
has been widely studied within the realm of hate crime literature. Victimization of 
lesbians, gay men and bisexuals (LOB) has been linked to :1. number of problems for the 
victim following the attack. Victimization (i.e., ridicule, physical atiacks) during 
childhood for LOB individuals has been associated with a number of mental health 
problems (Remafedi, Farrow & Deisher, 1991; Shaffer, Fi~hcr, Hicks, Parides & Gould, 
1995). Rivers (1996) stated that LGB yout:hs who experie1H:e victimization due to their 
sexual orientation are at greater risk for suicidal behavior. i it~orge and Behrendt (1988) 
suggested that lower self-esteem among victimjzed LGB. b_i lviduals is correlated with 
difficulties in maintaining_ intimatc·relationships. Herek (l ()94) also reported that 
crimina] victimization (i.e., vandalism of personal property, physical attacks) has 
t..~gative impacts onthe victims of such crime, such as emo, .~mal and cognitive problems 
(e.g., depression, anxiety), somatic disturbances (e.g., physical injury related to the crime, 
sleep disturbances), behavioral problems (e.g., suicidal iclc,·.t\lrm), and interpersonal 
problems (e.g., avoidance of social contacts). 
The patterns of victimization among LOB individu~d.·: have beencomparcd tc that 
of rape victims (Rivers & D' Augelli, 2001 ). Tn fact, victim-: uf hate crime assaults are 
s 
nftcn. hJnmcu und characterized as deserving their attack in much the samt! way that rape 
victin1s have been (Hcn:k, 1 (J94). However, along with the dii'cct impact that. 
victimization has on an individual, sccond,iry victimizatiOn (i.e., being outed) is alF:o a 
problem for LOB individuals. They may often find themselves in situations of 
discrimination from those who learned about their sexu3l orientation as a result of the 
attack. This scenario may lead to further impacts such as loss of employment, child 
cut,wdy, or relationships (Herek, 1994). Further~ the impact of secondary victimization is 
wh8t may prevent reporting of some hate crimes. 
Despite the negaiive consequences associated with hate crimes perpetrated against 
LGB individuals, little research has cxarnincd people's perceptions of sexual-orientation 
based hate ~rime in the courtroom. In fact, Jacobs and Potter (1998) pointed out the 
many ways in which enforcing and prosecuting hate crime laws have not only failed but 
have led to no further knowledge about the contributlons of having such laws in place. 
Many special interests groups (e.g., Anti-Defamation League, Jewish Defense League, 
NY City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project) maintain that hate crime legislz.tion is 
an important legal issue to help gain equality, yet they do not have much data from law 
enforcement or prosecution records about how a hate crime is dealt with in the current 
legal system. Of the crime statistics that are reported, the number of arrests and/or 
prosecutions for bias-motivated assault are quite low (i.e., ranging from 9% to 16% of 
reported crimes ending in anest or prosecution; Jacobs & Potter, 1998). 
There are many speculations as to why perpetrators of hate crimes are not arrested 
and/or charged for t!1eir crime (e.g., police indifference, crime not recognized as bias-
motivated). However, the reasons a perpetrntor may be arrested and charged wHh a hate 
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crime but not pros<.~cntcd remain equivocal. h.,· ... ights into how people define and attribute 
. biame for hate crimes may be helpful in this regard. In order for the legal system to bring 
a perpetrator to trial on charges or bb!Hnotivated as:-mult, they must be able to prove their 
case to a jury. Since there is no published research in the area of juror decision-making 
when it comes to bias-motivated assault (based on sexual o.rientation), prosecutors and 
defenders are left to try and find the least biased jury through voir dire questioning, in 
which jurors often lie (Ginger) 1990). Trying to find the least biased jury poses a 
problem for both prosecutors and defenders, especially when they are unaware of what 
factors may influence juror decision-·rnaking in such cases. 
Attribution Theory 
There are many reasons why someone deciding the guilt or innocence of a person 
who is accused of committing a crime may make their decision. One of the factors 
considered by these fact-finders (i.e., judges, jurors) is how much blame or responsibility 
the person accused of c·)mrnitting a crime holds for the event that took place. There are 
many different theories about how people attribute blame or responsibility to certa~ 
parties (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967; Schachter, 1964; Bem, 1967, 
1972; Vv einer 1979, 1985). What all of these theories have in common is the idea that all · 
people try to fom1 causal explanations for events that have occurred. As social perceivers 
we arrive at judgments based on the infonnation we have (i.e., what areas are most 
important to us in making our decision) and how we combine it. 
According to Kelley (1972), people try to understand ~~he cause of an event by 
looking at evidence in three areas: its consistency over time (i.e., Whether or not it has 
happened in similar situations), its distinctiveness (i.e., whether or not it has happcr1cd 
JU 
before), and other people's experiences with iL However, this type or (' 11i<lencc is 
typically notavai.luble in most Cll~CS. Rather. (/it_; only infonnution VvC 111:Jy have is the 
singie occurrence of the event itself. This situation is salient in the courtroorn where 
previous evidence, charg::)s, or convictions are not allowed to oc used against a person 
accused of a crime. Therefore, jurors are left with only the sinr~J.e case on which to base 
their judgment. 
In cases such as this, Kelley (1972) argued that people will gi·ve· more weight to a . 
facilitative cause (something that promotes that particular event) than to an inhibitory 
cause (something that would weaken or undermine that particular event). This theory 
combined with Heider's (1958) contribution of the distinction between internal 
(generated by the person} or external ( caused by the sit11ai.ion) atlributi0ns is what leads 
to errors in attribution. There are many attribution biases and errors that have been 
identified (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967; Jones & Nisbett, 19'71 ). At the heart of these 
different eftects is the fundamental attribu.tfon error (FAE). 
The FAE states that when the perceiver is attempting to judge an ev~nt, he or she 
will overestimate dispositional (internal) attributions and underestimate situational 
( external) attributions when judging the behavior of others involved in that event. It may 
be the case that because so little infonnation is typically available to the perceiver that 
she or he simply looks at faciWative and internal causes for the event. However, studies 
have shovvn(Trop\~) 1986; Trope, Cohen & Maoz, 1988) that even when the perceiver has 
some of the information he or she would use to make caus2l explanrttions, she or he may 
still categorize the event, the situation in which it occurs, and the prior information he or 
she has about the person she or he is judging in terms of disposition-relevant behavior. 
11 
~{i1nply rmt, the inl'orrnation they arc f!athering i:.\ heing 11scd lo dceide whether or not th iii 
person is good or bad. Using this information ;·athcrthanthe situation in ciec,ding 
whether or not someone would (or shouJd) be held responsible for the cause of the event 
is one such effect of the F AK This bias is said to stem in part from the actor-observer 
effect (Jones & Nisbett, 1971 ). 
The actor-observer effect explains that when one (the obserYer) is making a 
judgment about another's (the actor) behavior, the observer tends to explain the actor's 
behavior in terms of dispositional factors and her or his own behavior in terms of 
situational fa.ctors. That is, we tend to ignore situational factors when explaining the 
behavior of others. Many studies have been conducted producing extensions and 
qualifications of the actor-observer effect (Goldberg, 1978; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant & 
. . 
Mamcek, 1973; Zaccaro & Lowe, 1985). One such extension conducted by Miller and 
· Norman (1975) demonstrated that active onlookers ·would be even more inclined thnn 
passive observers to attribute an actor's behavior to dispositional factors. Therefore, 
members· of a jury may fall victim to the actor-observer effect more so than someone who 
3imply witnessed the event take place. When deciding how to explain an event in most 
situations, these biases and errors do not have much consequence for those involved. 
However, for the defendant in a courtroom setting, these errors and biases may be of dire 
consequence. Along with deciding how to explain an event, there are also errors made in 
deciding who is to be hel<l responsible for an event, or taking it one step farther, who is to 
blame. 
Although attributions of rcsponsibiiity and attributions of blame both point out 
who can be held accountable for outcomes of an event, they diffor slightly in that 
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attributions of blame arc typically reserved fc)r cases in which the causal agent (or- person 
held respons.ible) is subjectto punishment for a negative event (McGraw, 1987). 
Attribution of responsibility depends on the ability to identi.l~> the part1~~ular person who· 
caused the event, the belief that the person should have been able to foresee the outcome, 
the perception that the person's actions were not justified by the situation, and the belief 
that the person acted out of free choice (McGraw, 1987). In the context of the courtroom 
one might typjcally think of attributions of blame in the context of deciding whether or 
. not someone is guilty of a crhnc. However this type of attribution (and its associui~d 
errors and biases) may spill over into blaming the victim of a crime. If a decision-maker 
. is mi.able to pinpoint certain aspects of the de fondant's behavior, or he or she feels that . 
she or he may have acted in a similar fashion as the defendant in that situation ( c.f:, 
defensive attribution hypothesis, Burger, 1981 )~ he or she may attempt to locate 
responsibility for the event in terms of the victim's behavior. Related to attributions of 
blame for a victim is Lerner's (1970) just-world hypothesis which states that people have 
a need to see the world as a controllable and fair place in which good things happen to 
good people and bad things happen to bad people. This can lead to blaming the victim 
through the belief that the person deserved what happened simply b~cause if she or he 
were a good person the bad event would not have happened in the first place. 
Attribution theory is applicable to any area in w~ich people are judging the 
behavior of oi\er~. Examining pmiicular biases and err0rs may be especially helpful in 
arena3 such as the courtroom, where it is someone's responsibility to judge the behavior 
of others. In cGses such as hate crimes, unde1 ;;tanding which errors and biases are pr~sent 
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when making attributions nnd how potential jurors use these attributions ~n deciding their 
verdict may help shape the future of how others view hate crime and hate .. ~rime laws. 
l4 
CH/\PTER il 
OVERVIB W OF RESEAKCl-I PROGRAM 
Very little research has been done on the juror decision-making process in BllY 
type of hater.rime. As perceptions of fact-finders (i.e.,judges and jurors) are pivotal in 
H1e courtroom for those cases tJ1at must be tried~ hov: ihey view and attriLute blame for 
the cases they hear could alter how ~J~rpetrators are punished. With a h1story of 
successful d~fenses such as "homosexual advance~' def~nse (Schick v. State, 1991 )1 in 
which an attack on a gay man was seen as justifiable, it is of utmost importance to know 
how jw-ors arc influenced by the way the lcgt'l system views a crime. 
One way jurors may know how the crime is viewed by the criminal justic. system 
is by the label it .is given (i.e., first degree assault, bias-motivated assault, etc.) and the 
choices they have to choose from when handing dovvn their decision and sentence (i.e., 
guiity of assault, not guilty, etc.). Although many studies have looked at attitudes toward 
gay men and lesbians (Herek, 1989), the impact hate crimes have on theit victims (Herek, 
1994; Rivers & D' Augelli, 1001 ), and attitudes toward hate crime laws (Johnson & 
Byers, 2003; Miller, 2001) none have empirically .Jxamined the effect oflabeling a crime 
as "hate" on juror perceptions of a bias-motivated crime based on heterosexism and those 
involved. 
1 The crise of Schick v. State (1991) involved the .nurder of a gay man. The facts of the case were that a 
non~gay man solicited a sexual favor from a gayrnan and aflcnvard beat him to death. Defense in this case 
claimed that th(:. non-gay man wa~ so shocked by his actions that his fear and angel' ovenvhelmed him and 
therefor~ his behavior (beating a gay man to death) was justifiable. The jury in this case agreed and found 
the defendant not-guilty. 
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Giving a crime the label of "hale crimen curries with it the at;sumption behind 
why the crime \Vas committed; that is, the perpetrator committed the crime against a 
vic~im because of a negative bias towards the social group to which the victim belongs, 
and further, that the perpetrator intern.Jed to inflict harm not only on that individual but 
against that group as a whole. F11rthennore, hate crimes hold greater penalty for the 
perpetrator than ifa crime were labeled as another type of crime (Hate Crime Sentencing 
Enhancement Act, 1993) .. Implicitly then, a hate crin .c is considered more severe 
because of why it was committed than another type of crime. This may lead fact finders 
(i.e., judges and jurors) to attribute blame for the crime differently as well as penalize the 
perpetrator more harshiy. 
Study one sought to investigate the impact of labeling a crime on juror decision-
making and attributions of the crime. As hate crimes have become a topic of mainstream 
debate, it was anticipated that mock~jurors would make significantly different decisions 
as well as attributions of the crime based on both the labeling of the crime and the 
gender2 condition of the trial in which they were involved (i.e., gay man or lesbian). By 
labeling the crime as bias-motivnted basec! on legal standards, it takes the onus off of the 
juror to decide why the crime was committed. Using the label of hate crime may then 
serve to reduce any attribution errors (e.g., blaming the victim) that may have been 
employed by jurors when trying to decide their verdict. Therefore, it was hypothesize<l 
that jurors within the "assault" labeled condition would be kss likely to find the 
defendant guilt:.' than those in the "bias-motivatedn labeled condition. Furthermore, 
consistent with stereotypes of gay men and lesbians it was anticipated that jurors would 
2 The lcrm 14Sex" is typically used in reforencc to biological charactcristi .. :s. However, because people arc 
oflen judged on the degiee to which they conform to culturally constrncted 1\otions of whnt it means to. be 
male or fem~le, the term ''gender" will be used throughout this pnpcr. 
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dttributc more blame for the crime to the forrwlc lhan to the rn.ale defendant. As has hcen 
. . 
shown in cases such as S,;hick v. State (J 991 ), jurors may hold stereotypes ana)ogous to 
"sexual. advance defense" in which they more readily see an attack on a gay man as 
justifiable and in turn may more easily attribute blame to the femaic perpetrator than the 
male perpetrator. 
As the first study involved a scenario portraying a ('typical" hate crime (i.e., 
perpetrated against minority sexual orientation, involved violence and name-ca1Jing), it 
was also of interest to examine a scenario that does not fit the ty~Jical notion of hate 
cri1m.~. In fact, the inclusion of gender or sex as a category of hate crime is a topic of 
much debate among law enforcement as well as kgal and psychology scholars. Although 
the category has made its way into the statutes of some states (i.e., nc, CA, CO, CT, HI, 
MD, MN, MO, NM, PA, VT) many argue that gender-based crimes (in most ci.ises, 
crimes against women) fa.JI under domestic violence statutes rather than bias-motivated 
crimes. Most domestk violence statutes include crimes against both women and men, 
however it has been noted that crimes against men are often underreported and that these 
statutes do not have a great success rate for conviction (U.S. Department of Justice, 
2000). Another problem with induding gender--based crimes under domestic violence · 
statutes is that these statutes include only pmtners living together or sharing some fom1 of 
domestic relationshir (~.e., they share children, they were once married). 
Cases such as rape and battering of a non-domestic partner may very well fit into 
hate crime statutes more readily than domestic violence statutes. Studies have suggested 
that one of the factors that motivate mcfi to rape is hostility toward women (Dricschncr & 
Lange, 1999; Zurbriggen, 2000). Because the motivation behind ,vhy the <..rime is being 
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committed (i.e., a person ·hates.a group of' people with a 8imi'lar chnract.,.~ristic) is the 
defining feature of a huti.~ c1.·imc1 it would ~;;c,;,:m then that gen<.for-basc<l cr.irlles may fall 
under hate crime statutes. 
To investigate perceptions of non-typical hate crimes, the second study examined 
the impact of labeling a gender-based crime as assault or bias-motivated and varied the 
gender of the victim. In this study, the gender of the victim and perpetrator we-re always 
opposite. That is, both crimes against women perpetrated by men as well as crimes 
against men perpetrated by women were examined. As the scenario in this study did not 
fit the typical notion of a hate cri.1.1le, it was hypothesized that jurors in this study would 
find the defendant guilty more often when the crime is labeled as assault than \Vhen it is 
labeled as bias-mot~ vated (hate crime). Also, based on gender stereotypes that 
characterize v.:omen as passive and men as aggressive, it was hypothesized that more 
blame will be attributed to the female victim than to the male victim. 
Taken together, the first two studies examined how victim gender and crime label 
may influence juror decision-making in both typical (study 1) and non-typical (study 2) 
hate cr;me scenarios. As extra-legal factors such as the location and events surrounding 
the crime may play a role in how jurors perceive a typical (i.e., based on sexual 
orientation) hate crime, the final study varied both the location and level of 
"provocation3" within the context of a bias-motivated crime based on sexual orientation. 
The scenario in the final study was identical to that used h1 ~t~!~:,' 1 with the exception 
that the event always involved two men, one who identified as heterosexual (the alleged 
3 A !though it. is commonly believed that hnte crime victims may "provoke" the attack against them, it is 
important to note that these crimes are inflicted rather than "provoked." To ensure that readers do not lose. 
site of this distinctioa, the terms "provocation': and "provoked" will appear in quotations (Kristiansen & 
Giulietti, 1990). 
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perpetrator) and oncwl-w identified as h<)mo:~cxw11 (the alleged vietim), and the cdme 
was referred to as a bias-,motivatcd assault(ba'cc ci'irnc) in all conditions. The conditions 
that were altered involved location of the crime and ''provocation'~ on the pait of the 
victin1. Spedfically, the scenarios read by mock~urors included information that the 
alleged assault took place in either a local bar O .e.> not a gay bar) or in a gay bar. Within 
location conditions, jurors read that the alleged victim either "provoked" the assauit b~,1 
putting his arm around the alleged perpetrator and asking him to slow dance or 
alternatively, he did not '~provoke,, the assault by simply vva!king away after talking wirh 
the alleged perpetrator. 
These types ofextra-legal factors may play a pivotal role in the decision-making 
process on the part of mock-jurors in a case such as this. Approaching someone of the 
same sex and asking him or her to dance may be seen as more justifiable in a setting such 
as a gay bar where it might be expected. Jurors may therefore attribute more blame to the 
perpetrator in that setting. As "provocation" may increase victim blaming on the part of 
mock jurors, it was expected that in the "provocation'~ present condition, jurors will 
attribute more blame to the victim. 
Taken together, this program of research consisted of three studies aimed at 
· examining factors that may play a role in juror decision-making in court trial cases 
involving bias-motivated ac;suult (hate clime). These studies investigated such variables 
as the court's labeling of the crime and victim gender in 00th typical and non-typical hate 
crime scenarios as well as extra-legal factors such as location and ''provocation'' that may 
alter decision-making and attribut{ons of blame. Overall, they may inform the legal field 
about the aspects of certain types of crime (i.e., typical or non-·typical) that may have an 
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impact on juror decision-making in these much debatr:d hate crime statutes. Finally, this 
series of studies may also help fill a knowledge gap within the. vast area of attribution 





Althougl1 many researchers have looked at attitudes toward gay men and lesbians 
(Her<~k, 1989), the impact hate crimes have on their victims (Herek, 1994; Rivers & 
D' Augelli, 2001), and attitudes toward hate crime laws (Johnson & Byers, 2003; Miller, 
2001 ), none have investigated the labeling of the crime on juror v·~rdicts and attr;butions 
of blame and responsibility in a bias-motivated crime committed against a gay mtm or 
lesbian. The goal of this project was to better understand how potential jurors view hate 
crime and how they attribute blame for the crime to the perpetrator, victim and situation. 
Gaining knowledge as to how these crimes are viewed in the courtroom not only 
addresses a gap in the knowledge base but may also provide better understanding of the 
controversy that surrounds the idea of labeling a crime as Hhate"'. Although some may 
see the label of '(hate'~ or even "bias-motivated" as infringing upon their rights to feel · 
how they want about a person or group of people, the effect of such a label may in tum 
serve to highlight the difference between feeling how one wents to (i.e., upholding 
constitutional rights) an'"~ committing criminal acts. 
The central hypothesis of the current study was that the label hate crime versus 
alternative labels of crime, would serve to reduce attribution en-ors, specifically victim 
blaming, on the part of potential jurors as indicated by their verdict .and their ratings of 
blame for the crime for both the victim and defendant in cases that fit the typical notion 
21 
or what a hate crime is. Victim blaming rnay be rc:.duced by tl1(~ l~hel of "hate" bc~ng 
added to a crime due to .the reason implied about the nature or lhe crime (i.e., tlwt the 
perpetrator held prejudice against the victim) as opposed to other reasons jurors may 
a.ttribute to the nature of the crime when other labels are used (e.g., the victim~s actions, 
fear of the perpetrator, defense against sexual advance, etc.). Victim blaming may also 
be influenced by jurors1 attitudes toward gay men and lesbians in ca~es of bias-motivated 
crimes due to het.erosexism. 
Further understanding of hov.r blame is attributed ins\ h crimes may lend itself to 
help shape public policy on how hate crime laws are developed, enforced and prosecuted 
in the United States; Gaining knowledge about juror decision-making in such cases will 
also,cncourage further work in this and related areas by both psychology and legal 
scholars. This projF,.~ct explored the factors jnfluencing juror decision making in a case 
involving bias-motivated assault (hate crime), specifically how the crime was labeled as 
well as investigating how blame for the .crime was attributed to both the perpetrator and . 
:<:tim inYolved in a hate crime. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N=l 14) were recruited via follow-up phone calls after having filled 
out a prescreen questionnaire measuring level of heterosexis111 in an undergraduate 
·ychology course. Participants were asked to play the part of mock-jurors in a study on 
i·ccptions of crime. They were randomly assigned to one of four conditio·ns stemming 
from a '2 (label: assault vs. hate crime) x 2 (victim gender: gay man vs. lesbian) factorial 
I. 
i 
Of the pruiicipants, the sample included 79 women. Participants' ages ranged 
from 1°8--41, with a majority (31 % ) of participants being under the age of 21. The 
majority of participants were a1~o Caucasian/white (95%), and freshman or sophomore 
status undergraduates (71 %}. All but one participant (who reported bisexual) reported 
their sexual orientation as heterosexual. 
A1aterials 
The materials for study one included a simulated jury room, trial transcripts ,md 
questionnaires. The trial transcripts contained all aspects of a court trial including 
opening statements from judge, defense, ::md prosecution, direct and cross examination of 
witnesses~ closing statements, and the judge's charge. The trial transcripts were based on 
reported incidences of hate crim~ (Herek, Cogan & Gillis, 2002), Minnesota penal code 
for assault in the firstdegree (Penal Code§ 609.221(1, 2)) and assault motivated by bias 
(Penal Code § 609.2231( 4)), and similarly conducted tTial s~ttings (i.e., jury simulation 
studies). The facts of the case were as follows: the alleged victim (Grear) and alleged 
perpetrator (Smith) wtre in a Jocal bt·r (i.e., not a gay bar) and they began a conversation. 
Grear bought Smith a drink. Grear then asked Smith to slow dance and Smith begun 
beating Grear until he or she was unconscious. Throughout the trial the case was referred 
to as either first-dc6ree assault or bias··motivated assault (hate crime) depending on the 
condition. 'Nithin each condition the alleged victim and alleged p~rpetrator were of the 
same gender (Appendix A). 
Questionnaires 
Prescrecn. This measure nssesscd each participanf s level of homophobia, 
specifically support or non-support of non-heterosexual community members, using the 
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Index of Homophobia (1HP~ Hudson & Rickdts, 1980). Participan•.s were asked to rate 
the extent to which they agreed with statements such as: ''I would enjoy attending sociaI 
functions at which gay men and/or ,esbians were present" and "I would foel 
uncomfortable knowing that my son's male teacher was gay." Items were rated on a scale 
of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Certain items were reverse coded and the 
scale was scored for each participant. The possible range of scores for this scale was 
from -A (non ·support) to 4 (support) v rith recent studies noting that amount of 
homophobia as measured by this r.cale was influenced most by social .interactjon, 
residence and religiosity, with scores vnrying as a function of these variables (Snively, 
Kreuger, Stretch, .,vatt & Chadha, 200~; Span & Vidal, 2003). The range of participant 
scores in this study were ... ].69 to 3.07 (Af::= -0.22, SD-.::: 1.42). A mt.~dian (0) split ·was 
used to categorize participants as either high or ]ow according to their level of support for 
gay community members. 
Demographic questionnaire. Participants were asked to i~dicate their age, sex, 
· race, education level and sexual orientation. 
Individual jurcr verdict. Participants were asked to indicate whether they support 
a guilty or not-guilty decision in the case based on legal standards. The label of ''assault" 
or "assault motivated by bias (hate crime)" was varied depending upon condition .. 
Private belief rating scale. Participants were asked to indicate their private 
beliefa (not bound by legal standards) concerning the guilt of the defendant on a scale 
ranging from -5 (certain defendant should not be convicted) to +S(ccrtain defendant 
shou.ld be convicted), to 'Nhich the participant believed the alleged prrpetrator should be 
convicted (not bound by legal standards). This scale has been used in pr1:vious studies 
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crnployingjmy simulation paradigms to assess beliefs not bound by legal standards 
(KHsinn, i 1)9 I; 'krrnncc, 2000,L 
Hate crime. Participants were asked to indicate their belief about w·~ether or ,1ot 
the defendant committed a hate crime. Possible responses ranged from O (strongly 
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). 
Victim blame. This scale consisted of seven items (Chronbach's a= 0.79) and 
assessed the degree to which participants assigned blame to the victim. Possible 
responses ranged from O (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). These items we; 
summed and averaged to derive a contpositc score reflecting victim blame, and i.1 · udcd 
the following items: the victim is partly to blame for the action of the defendar,'. the 
defendant's actions were reasonable, the victim should Ir.now to be more cac d ubout 
· approaching someone whose sexual orientation is unknown, the defend[w 1 ,ctions were 
the result of unwanted advaJlccs by the vktim, the defendant was pr<Yvc. , , the 
defendanf s actions \Vere justified, and the victim deserved it. 
Personal decision. Participants were asked to list, as briefly :is t-,ossible, the 
reasons for their personal decision in this case. This was an open-ended questiom1afre 
limited only by the page length. Responses were cla;:;.t;;ified to include ail statements 
made by participants regrnding their reas0ns for their decision in the case. Statements 
were dual-wded if necessary. The classification scheme was derived .1fter reading aJi 
statements and listing the type of argument presented. Responses were classified into six 
categories including: legal arguments, physical evidence, morality statements, victim-
related statements, witness and/or perpetrator crcdi bi 1 i;, ind extra- legal factors. Wiihin 
each category~ statements 1nade regarding the dccisioi ,I' guilty or not gt1.ilty were nlso 
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clns:-:i fied. Statements were assessed independently by two scorers with n 3trong mf.cr-
rnter reliability coefficient (r:::=:0.93). Discrepancies were discussed and~ decision to 
classify each statementdualiy or individually was made (Appendix B). 
Procedure 
Participants were signed up over the phonC:; for a "jury time" by a research 
assistant. Whea they arrived, they were seated in the jury room where the study was 
explained to them and they read ancl sign an informed consent form (Appendix C). E8.ch · 
condition consisted of 27 to 30 participants and at ieast one member of the opposite.sex 
was recrnited for each jury. They were each given a random juror number and were 
asked to fill out a demographic questiom1aire. After filling out the questionnaire, they 
1vvere given one of four trial transcripts (depending upon condition) and asked to read 
through itcarefuUy. The transcript was then recollected when foey were finished reading 
it and they were asked to fill out questionna·ires assessing their verdict in tl1e case .~ weH 
as their perceptions of the perpetrator and defendant. After filling out all questionnaires, 
participants were then debriefed and compensated for their time. 
Results 
Individual Ju, or Verdict 
A Pearson Chi Square analysis was conducted to evaluate the effects of label and 
gender of victim on ratings of guilt. Results failed to yield significance for label, x2 
=0.05, ns (guilty votes: assault: n = 41; hate crime: n = 45), or for victim gende!', x2 
=0.19, ns (guilty votes: male: n = 42; fomale: n= 44). 
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Private Belief Rating /Scale 
A 2 (label: hate crime vs. assault) x 2 (victim gender) analysis of variance 
(1\.NOVA) was ccmducted on paiticiprmts' private belief ratings. Results failed to yield 
sjgni ficance for either labei, F'(l, 110)=2.07, ns, victim gender, F<I, or their interaction~ 
F<l .. In order to ass1~ss the extent to which participants believed the defenda.T1t should.be 
convicted overall, participant responses were tested against the rr:idpoint of the scale (0). 
Whe!1tested against the midpoint of the scale, there was a significant .~ffect, · 
t(l l 3)=11.20, p<.O 1, such that participants overwhelmingly believed that the defenda11t 
should be convicted (M=2.52, SD=2.40). 
Hate Crime 
A 2 (label: hate crime vs. assault) x 2 (victim gender) ANOV A was conducted on 
participants' ratings of their belief that the defendant had committed a hate crime. 
Results failed to yield significance for either !2bel, F(l, 110)=2 .57, ns, victim gender, 
F<l, nr their interaction, F<l.. In orderto assess the extent to which participants 
believed the defe~dant committed a hate crime ove-rall, participai~tresponses were tested 
against the midpoint of the scale (3). When tested against the midpoint of the scale, there 
was a significant effect, t (113) = 6.09,p< .01, such that participants stated that tr.~y 
believed the defendant did commit a hate crime (lvi=3.99, SD=l.74). 
Victim Blame 
A 2 (label: hate crime vs. assault) x 2 (vic6m gender) x 2 (support for gay 
community members: high vs. low) ANOVA was conducted on participants' ratings of 
victim blame. Results failed to yield significance for either label, F<I, or victim g~nder, 
F<l. Results did indicate a significam difference for support for gay community 
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n1embers, F(L: 106)=11.73,p<.01~ suc.;h that those who showed low support for gay 
communi.ty mcrnbcrs \Vere more likely to blame the vietim (A,f=2.40, SD=0.97) than those 
who showed high support for gay community members (M==1JL. ST.x:-:-=0.72). The 
interactions between label and victim gender, F(l, 106)=2.83, ns, label and suppor., F<l 1 
victim gender and support, F<l, or label, victim gender and ~upport., F<l, were not 
significant. 
Personal Decision 
A content analysis was conducte<l using open-ended participant responses. Each 
participant made at least one statement with most making more than one. Each statement 
was classified with the possibility that it coul.J b0 dualwcoJe<l for a total of .. 10 
statements. Responses were classified into six categories (legal arguments, physical 
evidence, morality statements~ victim-related statements, witness and/or perpetrator 
credibility, and extra-legal factors} as well as guilty or not guilty within each category 
(Appendix D). A frequency distribution indicated that participant responses often 
included statements regarding physical evidence (n=81 ). The next category into which 
statements fell most often was morality statements (n=67) with extra~legal factors being 
lowest (n:-=29). Others included legal arguments (n=4 7), victim-related statements 
(n=31), and witness and/or perpetrator credibility (n=55). More often than not, 
participants made statements regarding the guilt of the defendant (n=226) rather than 
perception that the defendant was not guilty (n=84; Table 1 ). 
Discussion 
Although no differences were found between the differe11tial labels of the crime 
and gender of the victim, re.~uhs do point to the fact thDt most pmiicipants regardless of 
. . . 
condition~ voted guilty, believed that the defendant should be convicted of the crime. and 
felt the defendant committed a hate crime. Given the relatively equal verdicts for assa.u!t · 
and hate crime, it may be the case that the nature of the crime (i.e., assault committed 
against a member of minority sexual odentadon) was too Dmbiguous ar.d therefore was 
perceived as fitting both crime labels (i.e., first degree assault and bias-motivated assault) 
equally~ Further, it may be the case that ibis situation is seen as very typical of both a 
hate crime as well as first degree assault and jurors responded to it as such. 
Since both the victim and defendant were of the same gender, gender ::;tereotypes 
may have been less salient in that they may have been viewed a4> being of equal size and 
strength. ffit had been the case of a male assaulting a femal~ or vice versa, gender 
stereotypes may have been more readily C[l.lled upon by jurors to help them. make their 
decision (i.e., differential size and strength may have been key factors in attributing 
blame). If this had been the case, differences corresponding to the gender of the victim 
based on these stereotypes may have been evidenced. 
In terms of the results regarding victim blame, it appears that although the crime 
label and gender of the victim had no effect, sorne bias was apparent in attributing blarne 
to the victim. Using the prescreen questionnaire to group participants into high or low 
support for gay community member (i.e., level of heterosexism), it appears that those 
who have high support for gay community members ( or less heterosexism) a:re less likely 
to employ victim blaming in this case. Although p:::rticipants in all conditions agreed that 
the defendant should be r,onvicted and that the d0fcndant committed a hate crime, there 




scenario. This difference was not due to the label of the crime or to the gender of the 
victim but rather to previously held attitudes of support for gay community membe:s. 
Those that previously rated their support for gay community members as high 
, vere less likely to blame the victim than those that rated their support us low. Given that 
this case involved gay or lesbian corr·-i.unity members, and previous studies have found 
negative attitudes about lesbians and gay men to be prominently held by heterosexual 
men and women (Kite & Whitley~ 1994; Yang, 1997), h is arguable that previously held 
attitudes on the pmis of the jurors may have played a bigger role in how they attributed 
blame in this case than the dispositional characteristics of the victim or the situation of 
the given event at hand. 
It may be the case that regardless of whether or not the defendant should be 
convicted or commitied a hate crime, some jurors may still be placing some of the blame 
on the victim. Implications of this are as far reaching as in the sentence doled out to a 
convicted hate crime perpetrator. This was evident in samples of the personal decision 
statements participants made. Statements such as "The victim wouldn't take no for an 
answer," and "The victim pushed it" both indicate some amount of blame directed toward 
the victim as though the assault would not have occurred had the victim not "provoked" 
it. 
Althotigh the main hypotheses of the current study were not supported, the 
information gleaned from the results may illuminate factors that need to be further 
explored in future studies. Prominent areas to be taken into consideration in future 
studies include the investigation of how prevjous attitL1des may play a role in juror 
decision-·making in cases involving hate crime, the exploration of hate crime using a non-
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typical setting or situation. und cxtru-Jegalfactors that mtly play a role in juror de.cision-
making and attributions of blame. The next two studies will exp.lore the3c last two areas - . . 
· by looking at a hate crime scenario based on gender rather than sexual orie1it.2tion (Study 
. 2) and investigating two extra-legal factors that may play a role in a typical hate ~rime 





The previous study focused on hate crime based on heterosexism using a scenarjo 
that portrayed the typical idea of what a hate crime consists of (i.e., perpetrated against 
minority sexual orientation, involves violence, committed by young person). In an ~ffort 
to further explore perceptions of hate crime, also of interest is u case in which the 
scenario does not fit the notion of a typical hate crime. One context in particular where 
this could be examined includes cases involving hate crime based on gender. 
Hate crimes based on gender are currently included in the hate crime laws of 
some states (including MN). However, the inclusion of gender in hate crime statutes is a 
topic of much debate as many of these crimes may fall under domestic violence statutes. 
Crimes against women are more often than not committed by a male domestic partner 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2000). Although domestic situations fall under domestic 
violence statutes, the fact that they are crimes based on gender (i.e., crimes against 
women) may also categorize them under hate crime statutes as well. Following the hate 
crime sentencing enhancement act (1993) many states have increased penalties for bim,-
motivr1ted crimes that may serve as harsher punishment. than their domestic violence 
statutes. Although si.atutes for domestic violence tmd hate crimes differ from state to 
state, each perpetrator can only be charged under one statute for each crime. Opponents 




cri.minals who commit these types of crime already exists. Problems with ilih argument 
however, are that not every crime motivated by sex or gender stems frorr. a domestic 
situation,nor is every gender-based crhne committed against women. 
Crimes against men committed hy women also exist and are very often ignored 
due to lack of reporting stemming from public ridicule of battered men (Steinmetz & 
Lucca, 1988). A man being assaulted by a girlfriend or wife may be evaluated negatively 
because he is perceived as violating gender-·based stereotypes that place men within 
positions of power (Brovennan, Vogel~ Braverman, C1arkson & Rosencrantz, 1972). 
Although gender or sex as a category of bias-m.otivatjon in hate crime is meant largely to 
protect crimes against women, it may also serve to highlight the often overlooked crime 
of intimate violence perpetrated against men by women. Given the historical ridicule of 
battered men, it may be easier for a man to report a crime based on the bias of a woman 
rather than a domestic dispute. Jn order to assess possible differential attributions for 
blame in cases involving a hate crime falling under the category of sex or gender, the · 
crime in this study was presented as an opposite-gender assault. 
Study tvvo also sought to investigate the impact of labeling a crime on juror 
decision-making and attributions of the crime. As the scenario in this study did not fit the 
typical notion of a hate crime, it was hypothesized that jurors in this study would find the 
defendant guilty more often when the crime is labeled as assault than when it is labeled as 
bias-motivated (hate crime). Also, based ongender stereotypes, it was hypothesized that 




Participc1nts (N=98) were recmited via follow-up phone calls after having filled 
outa contact questionnaire in an undergraduate psychology course. Participants were 
asked to play the part of mock-jurors in a study on perceptions of crime. They were 
randomly assigned tc one of four conditions stemming from a 2 (Iabe]: assault vs. hate 
crime) x 2 (vic.1 :1 sex: male victim vs. female v.ictim) factorial design. In this study the 
victim and perpetrator were always of opposite gender. 
Of the r~i1 licipants in this sample, 58 of them were women. The ages of 
participants rangeJ from 18-42 with a majority (86%) under the age of 21. A majority of 
participants in this study were also Caucasian/white {93%) and freshman or sophomore 
status undergraduaL:~s (86%). All participants except one (who reported bisexual) 
reported their sexm:il orientation as heterosexual .. 
Materials 
T11e material~ required for study two included a simulated jury room, trial 
transcripts and questi< rmaires. The trial transcripts contained all aspects of a ·~ourt trial 
including openlng statements from judge, defense, and prosecution, direct and cross 
examination of witnesses, closing statements, and the judge's charge. The trial 
transcripts were based on reported incidences of hate crime (Herek, Cogan & Gillis, 
2002), Minnesota pen:1' ·ode for assault in the first degree (Penal Code§ 609.221(1, 2)) . 
and assault motivated by : ,\as (Penal Code§ 609.2231 (4)), and similarly conducted trial 
settings (i.e., jury simulmion studies). The facts of the case were as follows: the alleged 
victim (Grear) and alleged perpetrator (Smith) were in a local bar and they began a 
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conversation. Orear bought Srnitha drink. Ot'ear then ar.:ked Smith to slow dance and i 
Smith began beating Grear until he or sh~ was unconscious. Throughout the trial the case 
was refene<l to as either first-degree assault or bias-motivated assault (hate crime) 
depending on the condition. Within conditions the alleged victim and alleged perpetrator 
were of opposite gender (Appendix E). 
Questionnaires 
Demographic questionnaire. Participants were asked to indicate their age, sex, 
race, education level and sexual orientation. 
Individual juror verdict. Participants were asked to indicate whether they support 
a guilty or not-guilty decision in the case based on legal standards. The label of "assault." 
or "ar;sault motivated by bias (hate crime)" was varied depending upon condition. 
Privatz be!iefrating scale .. Participants were asked to indicate their private 
beliefs (not bound by legal standards) concerning the guilt of the defendant on a scale 
ranging from -5 ( certain defendant should not be convtcted) to +5( ce1tain defendant 
should be convicted), to which the participant believed the alleged perpetrator shm1ld be 
convicted (not bound by legal standards). This scale has been used in previous studies 
employing jury simulation paradigms to assess beliefs not bound by legal standards 
(Kasian, 1991; Terrance, 2000). 
Victim is mentally unstable. Participants were asked to indicate their belief about 
whether or not the victim was mentally unstable. Possible responses ranged from 0 
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). 
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Hate crime. Participants were asked to indicate their belief about whether or not 
the defendant committed a hate crime. Possible responses ranged from O (strongly 
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). 
Reasonable. Pruiicipants were asked to indicate their belief that a reasonable 
person would have acted the same as the defendant. Possible responses ranged from 0 
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). 
Victim blame. This scale consisted of seven items (Chronbach's a= 0.82) and 
· assessed the degree to which participants assigned blmr~e to the victim. Possible 
responses ranged from O (strongly disagree) to 6(strongly agree). These items were 
summed and averaged to derive a composite score reflecting victim blame, and included 
the following items: the victim is partly to blame for the action of the defendant, the 
defendant's actions were reasonable, the victim should know to be more careful about 
approaching someone whose sexual orientation is unknown,.the defendant's actions were 
the result of unwanted advances by the victim, the defendant was provoked, the 
defendant's actions were justified, and the victim deserved it. 
Personal decision. Participants were asked to list, as briefly as possible, the 
reasons for their personal decision in this case. This was an open-ended questionnaire 
limited only by the page Jength. Responses were classified to include all statements 
made by participants regarding their reasons for their decision in the case. Statements , 
were dual-coded if necessary. The classification scheme wa~ derived after reading all 
statements and listing the type of argwnent presented. Responses were classified into six 
categories including: legal arguments, physical evidence, morality statements, victim.-
related statements, witness and/or perpetrator credibility, and extra-legal factors. Within 
36 
each category, statements made regarding thu decisions of guilty or not guilty were also 
classified. Statements were assessed independe11tly by two iscorers with a strong inter-
rater reliability coefficient (r=0.91). Discrepancies were discussed and a decision to 
classify each statement dually or individually ,vas made (Appendix F). 
Procedure 
Participants w~re signed up over the phone for a "jury time" by a research 
assistant. When they arrived, they were seated in. the jury room where the study was 
explained to them and they read and signed an informed consent fonn (Appendix C). 
Each condition consisted of 23 to 29 participants and at least one member of the opposite 
sex was recruited foreachjury. They were each given a random juror number and were 
asked to fill out a demographic questionnaire. After filling out the questionnaire, they 
were given one of four trial transcripts ( depending upon condition) and asked to read 
through it carefully. The transcript was then recollected when they were finished reading 
it and they were asked to fill out questionnaires assessing their verdict in the case as well . 
as their perceptions of the perpetrator and defendant. After filling out all questionnaires, 
participants were then debriefed and compensated for their time. 
Results 
Individual Juror Verdict 
A Pearson Chi Square analysis was conducted assessing difference in label (hate 
crime vs. assauit) and victim gender for verdict of guilty or not guilty. Results indicated 
a significant effect for label, i =9.96, p<.O 1) such that those in the assault condition (n = 
34) were more likely than those in the hate crime condition (n =22) to find the defendant 
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guilty. No signitfoant difference was found for victim gender, i ~o.85, ns (male: n = 27; 
female: n = 29). 
Private Belief Rating Scale 
A 2 (label: hate clime vs. assault) X 2 (victim gender) ANOV A was conducted on 
participants' private bielief ratings. Results failed to yield a significant effect for either 
label, F<l, victim gender, .F'<l, ortheir interaction, F(l, 94)=1.7 l, ns. In order 10 asse~m 
the extent to which partici"""·ants believed the defendant shonfr] bl": convictd. overall~ 
participant responses were tested against the midpoint of the s.caic (0). When tc£ted 
against the midpoint of the scale, there was a si.gnificant effect, !(97)~11.62,p<.Ol, such 
that participants stated that the defendant should be convicted (M=-/1.79~, SD=2.37). 
Victim is Mentally Unstable 
A2 (label: hate crime vs. assault} X2 (victim gender) ANOV A was conducted on 
participants' ratings of the victim as men.tally unstable. Results indicated a significant 
main effect for label, F(l, 94)=4.48, p<.05, such that participants in the assault condition 
(M=L83, SD=l.29) rated the victim as more mentally unstable than those in the hate 
crime condition (M=l .29, SD=l .39). No significant effect. was foun1 for victim gender, 
F(l, 94)=3.63, ns, or their interaction, F<1. 
·Hate Crime 
A 2 (label: hate crime vs. assault) X 2 (victim gender) ANOVA was conducted on 
participants' ratings of their belief that the defendant had committed a hate crime. 
Results failed to yield a significant effect for either label, F(l, 94)=2.32, ns, or victim 
gender, F<l. . Jn order to assess the extent to which participants believed the defendant 




the scale (3): When tested '71.gainst the midpoint ofthe scale, there Wa'; a significant 
effect, t(97) =:-= -3. 73, p<.01, such that p'lliicipants beHeved that the defendant did not 
commit a hate crime (M=2.28, SD=l .93). 
Reasonable 
A 2 (label: hate crime vs. assault} X 2 (victim gender) ANOVA was conducted on 
participants' ratings of the defendant as reasonable. Results indicated a significant main 
effect for label, F(l, 94)=5.67,p<.05, such that participants in the assault condition 
(M=0.70, SD=0.92) vvere more likely to see the defendant a~ reasonable than those in the 
hate crime condition (M==0.35, S/J:=0.62). This main effect was qualified by it; 
interaction with victim gender, F(l, 94)=7.95,p<.01. Simple effect analysis oflabe! at 
each level of gender indicated a significant effect only for the male victim ( or female 
perpetrator), F(l, 97)=7.93,p<.01. Participants reading the transcript depicting the 
victim as male and perpetrator as female were more likely to rate the perpetrator as 
reasonable in the assault condition (M=l .04, SD=0.98) than in the hate crime condition 
(M=0.26, SD=0.45). Results failed to yield significance for the female victim (mak: . 
perpetrator), F<l (hate crime label: M=0.41, SD=0.73; assault label: M=0.35, SD=0.71). 
See Figure 1. 
Vlctim Blame 
A 2 (label: hate crime vs. assault) X 2 (victim g~nder) ANOV A was conducted on 
participants' ratings of victim blame. Results failed to yield a significant effect for either 
label, F(], 94)=3.38, ns, victim gender, FO, 94)=0.42, ns, or their interaction, F<L 
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Personal Decision 
A content nnalysis was conducted using open-ended participant'responscs. Each 
participant made at least one statem~nt with most making more than one. Each statewent 
was classified with the possibility that it could be dual-coded for a totr_i of 276 
statements. Responses were classified into six categories (legal arguments, physical 
evidence, morality statements, victim-related statements, witness andior perpetrator 
credibility, and extra-legal factors) as well as guilty or not guilty within each category 
(Appendix G). Afrequency distribution indicated that participant responses often 
included stutemmts regarding physical evidence '~tr=66). The next category into which 
statements fell most often was morality statements (n=62) with ex1.m-lega1 factors being 
lowest (n=l 7). Others included legal arguments (n=57), victim-related statements 
(n=23), and witness and/or perpetrator crf)dibility (n=5 l). More often than not 
participants madt: statements regarding the guilt of the defendant (n=l 77) rather than . 
perception that the defendant ,vas not guilty (n=99; Table 2). 
Discuss1on 
This study explo1 ed differential crime classification and gender of the victim in a 
non-typical hate crime : ;r ~nario. The current study indicated differences for the labeling 
of the crime. Participant~ in the assault condition were more likely than those in the hate 
crime condition to find the defendant guilty. This is not surprising given that the scenario 
used in this study was a non-typical scenario for hate crime (i.e., committed because of 
the gender of the victim). Mock-jur~rs believed the defendant to be guilty of assault, but 
. the scenario was not seen as a hate crime and therefore when only given that option (i.e., 
gu1lty of bias-motivated assault or not guilty), jurors were finding the defendant not 
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guilty. This finding is in contrast to what was found i,1 stu<ly 1. Jurors jn that study were 
overwhe]mingly finding the defendant guilty Vlith no differences due to whether or not 
the crime was labeled as bias-motivated or first degree assault. The differences between 
these two scenarios were twofold. 
The first difference was that the study 1 portrayed a scenari0 thought to be very 
typical of a hate crime vvhereas the second study did not. This discrepancy may have 
been sufficient enough for participants to vote differentially on whether or not the 
· defendant was guilty. The second difference involves the gender of the alleged victim 
and alleged perpetrator. ln the first stuuy both parties involved were consistently th~ 
same genders~ in the second stud" they were consistently the opposite. Although 
differences in voting for guilty or not guilty were not shown via the gender of the victim, 
the situation of having them be same and opposite genders may have altered the way the.y 
were voting or their attributions ofblame. 
Participants in the assault condition rated the victimas more mentally unstable 
than those in the hate crime <.:cndition. Although again, there was no difference here for 
the gender of the victim, it would appear that labeling the crime as hate may be giving 
some legitimacy to the victim in cases of opposite-gender assault (i.e., the victim is not 
mentally unstable, the perpetrator holds bias). It may be the case that the label is 
providing a. facilitative cause (Kelley, 1972) to the jmors and therefore they are giving 
more weight to the idea that in a bias-motivated assault, the bias of the perpetrator is what 
is promoting the assault and not the actions of the victim~ Perhaps having some idea of 
why the attack occurred may have served to lessen victim blaming on the part of the 
jurors. In this study, not having that label, that built-in reason why, lerljurors to rote the 
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victim as mentally unstable more so than when they were impUcitly given that reason 
(i.e., it was labeled a hate crime). 
Additionally, participants in the assault condition also found the defendant guilty 
more often than those in the hate crime condition. At first glance it would seem that the 
hate crime label would serve to legitimize the victim and. in turn lead to greater 
conviction for the perpetrator. However in this case, it would seem that the view of the 
victim as ment1.lly unstable (greater within the assault condition) coincides with 
increased conviction rates for the defendant. It may be the case that jurors' perception of 
the victim as mentally unstable was not relevant enough to attribute blame to the victim. 
Likewise, the perception of the victim as mentally stable may not have been relevant 
enough to overshadow the fa.ct that this case did not fit the typical notion of a hate crime. 
Participants reading the transcript depicting the female perpetrator committing 
assault on a m~ le victim rated her as significantly more reasonable ( although ratings were 
still in the "disagree" region of the scale) when the assault was labe]ed as first degree 
assault rather than when it wa~ labeled as a bias-motivated assault (hate crime). That fa, 
jurors had a more difficult time seeing an attack on a male by a female as a hate criwe 
(i.e., she would be Jess reasonable in this scenario). Conversely, in the condition where a 
female victim was assault~d by a male perpetrator, the opposite rating was given (i.~., 
male perpetrator was rated more reasonable when labeled as hate crime than assault; 
although the difference did not reach significance). It appears that jurors .haci an easier 
time seeing the attack on a female by a male ~ a hate crime. It is arguable, based on the 
availability heuristic (i.e., it is much easier to think of instances when.~ a man assaults a 
woman than vice versa), that misogyny is much more apparent in our culture than 
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misandry and jurors may have had a difficult time seeing a female to male attack as due 
to hatred. 
The differences in study 2 may have had to do with the fact that the crime 
committed was an opposite-gender attack. Gender-based stereotypes support 
expectations regarding "appropriate~' behavior for men and women (Hilton & von Hipple, 
1990). For example, women are stereotypicaUy viewed as passive while me'n are seen as 
aggressive (Corely & Pollack, l ~96). Stereotypes delineating the roles of men and 
women are reflected within characteristics typically ascribed to domestic violence victims 
and offenders. Although this is not a case of domestic violence, the pairing between a 
man and woman in an assault scenario may hold some of the same expected descriptions 
of what roles men and women should play. Within the context of heterosexual domestic 
violence, women are perceived as the "legitimateH recipients of abuse, whereas men are 
seen as the perpetrators (Terrance, 2000). This assumption implies that it is more 
reasonable for a man to hold bias against a \Voman that may result in assault than it is for 
a woman to do the same for a man. Simply put, it is easier, given these delineated roles, 
to identify with the concept of misogyny than misandry; 
Although study 2 pinpointed some of the ways gender-role stereotypes may come 
into play for opposite-gender assault, no differences were found in study 1 with the 
portrayal of same-gender assault. This may be due to the fact that study 1 involved 
violence against a non-heterosexual person and this same-gender pairing may be why no 
differ_enceswere shown. In an opposite-gender assault, gender is evident, along with 
gender-role expectations including the belief that men are stronger and more aggressive 
than women. In a same-gender assault, the perpetrator and victim. may have been viewed 
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as ha.ving the possibility 0f being mutually combative (i.e., two men are of the same 
stt·ength and two women are of the same strength). In fact, many participants made 
personal decision 8taternents in accord with these stereotypes. Statements were made 
about the female perpetrator having to defend herself. No such statemen.~s were made 
when the perpetrator was depicted as male. It may be the case that when there is no 
apparent reason (i.e., hatred of men is not as apparent in our culture as hatred of women) 
for the attack that jurors postulate circumstances that were not provided to them in order 
to substantiate reasons the ati:ack may have occurred ( e.g., "She must have felt threatened 
to a certain extent" and "I think she had some ulterior motive for continuing to beat him 
while on the ground that goes beyond his sexual actions"); 
Society constructs gender in oppositional tenns: what men are, women are not, 
and vice versa (Renzetti; 1999). It is·women's "'nature" to be passive and dependent, 
wllHe men are described most often as assertive (Hegstrom & McCarl-Nielsen, 2002). If 
this is the case, why would a woman committing assault against a man. have been rated as 
more reasonable? If gender-role stereotypes are what is at work here, this seems 
incongruent with the previous finding. It is this incongruence that may explain why the 
femal~ in this scenario is seen as more reasonable than the male. In searching for t!1e 
expected gender-role behavior, jurors were lefl empty-handed reading an assault scenario 
where a woman attacks a man simply by virtue of his gender. The inability to find an 
apparent explanation led many participants to assume that there was something else going 
on. This scenario was often viewed as a self-defense scenario even though the attack was 
not "provoked" by the man. This type of explanation was evidenced in personal decision 
statements such as, "She folt uneasy and fighting him off was tl1e only way she felt safe" 
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and "She must have felt, threatened to a certain extent." In this way then (i.e., self-






The two previous studies focused on the impact of labeling a crime as hate, the 
type of crime that was committed (i.e., motivated by sexual orientation or gender) as well 
ns the gender of the victim and perpetrator. In addition to these impacts within Jegal 
cases, extra-legal factors such as location and situation also play a role in how jurors 
make decisions about a crime in a courtroom (Clark, 2000). Studies have looked at som,;! 
of these factors as they play a role in perceptions of bias-motivated crime based on 
racism (i.e., gender and race of the perpetrator and victim; Craig & Waldo, 1996; 
Marc.us-Newhall, Blake & Baumann, 2002). However no research has examined extra-
legal factors in a case involving bias~motivated crime based on heterosexism. As these 
factors tend to play a pivotal role in perceptions of other types of hate crime, it was 
expected that they too will play a role in heterosexist motivated crime. 
This study examined two possible extra-legal factors that may play a role in 
jurors' decision-making. First, the location of 'i.he crime was systematically varied. In 
this study, a similar trial scenario as in study one was presented depicting a case in which 
a bias motivated assault to'-;~ place (labeled ns a hate crime) between two men. The 
location of the events of the right in question was varied with the attack taking place in a 
local bar (i.e., not a gay bar) or in a gay bar. Approaching someone of the same gender , 
and asking them to dance may be seen as more justifiable in a setting such as a gay bar 
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where .it might be expected. Jurors may therefore attribute more blame to the perpetrator 
in that setting simp]y because of its unexpectedness or distinctiveness (Kelley, 1972). 
Second, "provocation" was varied. In the "provocation" present condition, the trial 
transcript was changed to convey that after the heterosexual man accepted a drink from 
the gay man, the victim proceeded to then ask the perpetrator to dance as he put hls arm 
around him before being hit by the perpetrator. In the "provocation'' absent condition, 
the transcript was changed to read that after the non-gay man accepted a drink from the 
gay man, the victim attempted to walk away before being hit by the perp~trator (i.e., he 
does not tocch him or ask him to dance). Kelley (1972) argued that people will give 
more weight to a facilitative cause (something that promotes that particular event) than to 
an inhibitory cause (something that would weaken or undermine that particular event). 
"Provocation" on the part of the victim may very well be viewed in this case as a 
facilitative cause. As "provocation" may increase victim blamingon the part ofmock 
jurors, it was expected that in the "provocation" present condition, jurors will attribute 
more blame to the victim. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N:--=77) were recruited via an announcement made in their 
undergraduate psychology course. Participants were asked to play the part of mock-
jurors in a study on perceptions of crime. Jurors were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions stemming from a 2 (location: local bar vs. gay bar) x 2 ("provocation'~: present 
vs. absent) factorial design. 
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Of the pruticipants in this sample, 40 of them were women. Participants' ages 
ranged from 18~30 with a majority (86%) of them being under the age of 21. A majority 
of participants in this sample were Caucasian/white. (87% ), of freshman or sophomore 
undergraduate status (88% )) and all participants reported their sexual. orientation as 
heterosexual. 
Materials 
Materials for study three included the same transcript (hate crime labeled, same · 
sex male conditions) as in study one with the exception of location and 4'provocation". 
Pe,·~~·.:ipants rend a trial transcript that stated that the assault took place in a local bar (i.e., 
not a gay bar) or altematively that the assault took place in a gay bar. \Vithin location 
conditions, participants read a trial transcript that depicted "provocation" on the part of 
the victim or no "provocation" on the part of the victim (Appendix H). 
Questionnaires 
Demographic questionnaire. Participants were asked to indicate their age, sex, 
race, education level and sexual orientation. 
Individual juror verdict. Participtmts were asked to indicate whether they support 
a guilty or not·guilty decision in the case ba5ed on legal standards. The label of "assaulf' 
or "assault motivated by bias (hate clime)" was varied depending upon condition. 
Private belief rating scale. Participants were asked to indicate their private 
beliefs (not bound by legal standards) concerning the guilt of the defendant on a scale 
ranging from -5 ( certain defendant should not be convi~ted) to +5( certain defendant 
should be convicted), to which the participant believed the alleged perpetrator should he 
convicted (not bound by legal standards). This scale has been used in previous studies 
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employing jury simulation paradigms to as:;ess beliefs not bound hy fegaJ standards 
(Kasinn, 1991; TerraMe~ 2000); 
Hate crime. Participants were asked to indicate their belief about whether or not 
the defendant committed a hate crime. Possible responses ranged from O (strongly 
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). 
Defendant solely to blame. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they believed the defendant was solely to blame. Possible responses ranged from 0 
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). 
Victim blame. This scale consisted of seven items (Chronbach's a= 0.88) and 
assessed the degree to which participants assigned blame to the victim. Possible 
rer;ponses ranged from O (stTOngly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). These items were 
summed and averaged to derive a composite score reflecting victim blame, and included 
the followir.g items: the victim is partly to blame for the action of the defendant, the 
defendant'~ actfons were reasonable, the victim should know to be more careful about . 
approaching someone whose s~xual orientation·is unknown, the defendant's actions were 
the result of unwanted advances by the victim, the defendant was provoked, the 
defendant's actions were justified, and the victim deserved it. 
Personal decision. Participants were asked to list, as briefly as possibie, the 
reasons for their persor.~al decision in this case. This was an open-ended questionnaire 
limitert only by the page length. Responses were classified to include all statements 
made by participants regarding their reasons for their decision in the cac;e. Statement, 
were dual .. coded if necessary. The classification scheme was derived after reading all 
statements and listing the type of argt!rnent presented. Responses were classified into six 
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categories including: h;)gal arguments, physical evidence, rnoraHty statements, victim-
related statements, witness and/or perpetrator credibility, and extra-legal factors. Within 
each category, statements made regarding the decisions of guilty or not guilty were also 
classified. Statements were a5sesscd independently by two scorers with a strong inter-
rater reliability coefficient (r=0.93). Discrepancies were discussed a.11d a decision to 
classify each statement dually or individually was made (Appendix I). · 
Procedure 
Participants we.re asked to participate at the end of class time in their psychology 
course. The study was explained to them by a research assistant and they rearl and signed 
an infonned consent form (Appendix C). Each condition consisted of 18 to 23 
participants and at least one member of the opposite sex was recruited for each jury. 
They were each given a random juror number and were asked to fill out a demographic 
questionnaire. After filling out the questionnaire, they were given one of four trial 
transcripts (depending upon condition) and asked to read through it carefully. The 
transcri;,t was then recollected when they were finished reading it and they were asked to 
fill out questionnaires assessing their verdict in the case as well as their perceptioAi:; 0f the 
perpetrator and defendant. After filling out all questionnaires, participants were then 
debriefed aiid compensated for their time. 
Results 
Individual Juror Verdict 
A Pearson Chi Square was conducted assessing the difference in verdict (i.e., 
guilty vs. not guilty) for location and "provocation.'' Results indicated no significant 
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difference for location, i' =0.41, ns (guilty votes: gay bar: n ~~ 29; Jocal bar: n = 23), or 
for "provocation," x2 ~0.11, ns (guilty votes: present.: n:::: 25; absent: n = 27). 
Private Belief Rating Scale 
A 2 (location: local bar vs. gay bar) x 2 C'provocation"; r,~esent vs. absent) 
ANOV A was conducted on participants' private belief ratings. Results failed to yield 
significance for either location, F(l, 73)=2.13, ns, "provocation," F<l, or their 
interaction, F(I, 73)=1.67, ns. In order to assess the extent to which participants believed 
the defendant should be convicted overall~·participant responses w~re tested against the 
midpoint of the scale (0). When tested against the midpo"int of the scale, there was n 
significant effect, 1(76)=7. 96, p<.O i, such that pan~cipants believed the defendant shout· 
be convicted (M=2.25, SD=2.48). 
Hate Crime 
A 2 (location: local bar vs. gay bar) x 2 ("provocation'': present vs. absent) 
ANOVA was conducted on participants' ratings of their belief that the defendant had 
committed a hate crime. Results fai1ed to yield significance for either location, F(l, 
67)=1.61, ns, "provocation," F<I, or their 1.nTeradion, F<l. In order to assess the extent 
to which participants believed the defendant committed a hate crime overall, participant 
responses were tested againstthe midpoint of the scale (3). When tested against the 
midpoint of the scale) results failed to yield significance, t (70) = 1.55, ns, such that 
participants did not agree nor disagree with the belief that the defendant corr.mitted a hate 
crime (}Y/=3.37, SD=l.99). 
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D4em/ant 510/ely to Blam2 
· A 2 (location: local bar vs. gay bar) x 2 ("provocation''; present vs, abs~nt) 
ANO VA \Va8 ct,nducted 011 participants' beli.cf that the defendant was solely to blame~ 
Results indicated a significant difference for location, F( 1, 67)=8. 70, p<.O 1, such that 
those in the gay bar conditiO'nwere more likely to state that the defendant was solely to 
blam~ (M-=4.24, SD=l .48) than those in the local bar condition (kl~3.20, SD=l. 75). No 
significant effect was found for "provocation," F(l, 67)=2.10) ns, or their inte.raction, 
F(l, 67)=2.59, ns. 
Victim l3lame 
A 2 (location~ local bar vs. gay bar) x 2 ("provocation": present vs. (ibsent) 
ANOV A was conducted on participants' ratings of victim blame. Results indicated a, 
significant main ~ffect for location, F(l! 67)=5.J8, p<.05, such that participants in the 
local bar condition (1W=2.39, S.D=l .29) were more likely to place blame on the victim 
than those in the gay bar condition (M= 1.83, SD=l .02). There was aiso a signiffoant 
main effect for "provocation," .F(], 67)=6.16,p<.05, such that thc,se in the "provocation" 
present conditkm (.M=2.40, SD=l .20) were more likely to pJace blar.ie on the victim t1rn.n 
those in the '·'provocR.tion" absent condition (M=UW, S.D=l.09). The interaction between 
the two was not significant, F'(l, 67)=2.18, r:s. 
Personal Decision 
A contt nt analysis was conducted using open~ended pa.nicipant responses. Ea~h 
participant made at least one statement whh mcst making more than one. Ea~h statement 
was classified with the possibility thal it could b~ dual-coded for a total of 211 
statement~. Responses were classified into six categoric~ (legal arguments, physical 
52 
evidence. morality statements, viclim-re~ated statements, wit111.~-ss and/or perpetrator 
credibility~ and extra .. legal factors) as well as guilty or not guilty within each ,~ategory 
(Appe!ldix .J). A frequency distribution indicated that participant responses often 
included statements regarding physical evidence (n=58). The next categorf into which 
statements fo]l most often was witness r.nd/o" perpetrator credibility (n=48) with extra-
legal factors being lowest (n=20). Others included legal arguments (n=28), morality 
statements (n=34), and victim-related. sfa.tements (n=23), More often than not 
partidpants made statements regarding the guilt of the defendant (n=l 48) rather tha..11 
perception that the defondant was not r,uilty (n=63; Table 3). 
Discussion 
Participants in this study believed the defendant should bt! convicted regardless of 
condition. Similar to Study 1, the scenario used appeared to ]end itself to decisions of 
buiJty on the part of the juron; ~n boti1 locations as well as whether or no{ the attack wru; 
"pr~,voked" by the victim. However, the area in which extra-legal factors appear t9 have 
a more substantial role in jurors' attributions of-victim blame. 
Specifically, those in the gay bar condition were more likely to ~tate t..1-iat the 
defendant was solely to biame than those in the local bar condition. It may be th~ case 
that jurors rated the defendant solely to blame in the gay bar more so than in the local bar 
because the scenario depicted (i.e.~ the alleged victim offers to buy the alleged perpetrator 
a drink) would be expected in that siturition. Furthermore, they may have viev.'ect, the 
sc0nario in such a way that the alleged perpetrator was placing himself in that situation 
therefore he bore more responsibility for his own behavior. 
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This is consistent with Kelley's (1972) suggestion that c:msistency, distinctiveness 
and othtr's experiences Df un e:vent help shape attributions for the event SpecificaJly, 
jurors appeared to alter their attributions based on what they thought the defendant shou]d 
have ~xpected (i.e., if he was in a gay bar he should have expected to be hit on by men). 
Attribution of respc.nsibility depends on the ability to identify the particular person who 
caused the event, the belief that the person should have been able to foresee the o,.itcome, 
the perception that the person's actions were not justified by the situation, and the belief 
that the person a.cted out of free choice (McGraw, 1987b ). P~acing soJ.e responsibility for 
the outcome on the defendant in a , -iminal case also attributes olame to him m her for the 
outcome by virtue of th~ setting (i.e., having been charged with a crime). 
Likewise, participants in the local bar condition were more likely to place blame or.i 
the victim than those in the gay bar comEtion. Being in a local bar (i.!!., not a gay bar) 
and having someone oft.he same sex offer to buy you a drink is a situation that is much 
more unexpected because of the location. In this situation then, the victim tends to be 
blamed more so for the actions of the perpetrator than he would have been had the event 
taken place in a gay bar. 
Finally, those in the "provocation" present cc.ndition were more likely to place blame 
on the victim than those in the ''provocation" absent condition. Again, some of the blame 
tends to be p]aced upon the victim if he is doing something that is unexpected or 
unaccepted by the jurors. Regardless of location, when the victim puts his arm arom1d 
the perpetrator and asks him to dance, he becomes much more responsible for hb own 
assault than had he simply asked tv buy the perpetrator a drink. If a juror is unable tu 
pinpoint certain aspects of the defendant's behavior (i.e., explain the reasons why the 
54 
defendant may have behav~d in such n way), or the Juror feels that she or he may have 
actcu in a similar fnshion as the defendant in that situation (c.f., defcnfr1e attribution 
hypothesis~ Burger, 1981 ), he or she may atteinpt to Jocate responsibility for the event in 
tenn:; of the victim's behavior. 1bis type of attribution wm; evident in some of the 
personal decision statements as well (e.g.," I would have acted aimost the same if a guy, 
after saying no, wouldn't leave me alone. I wouldn't hit him that much though"). 
Similar types of blame attributions have been previously used as succes.sful defenses in 
similar crimes of bias (i.e., Schick v. State, 1991). Furthermore, according to Kelley 
(1972), people will give more weight to a fadlitative cause (wmething that promotes that 
particular event) than to }Jn inhibitory cause (something that would weaken or undermine 
that particular event). Therefore even though participants identified the extent of 
"provoGation/' they may haYe been lending more weight to the "provocation-prescnf' 
~.cenario when deciding between guilty or not guilty, generating no differenc~s in guilt 




The current series of studies explored the effects of labeling a crime as hate and 
the gender of the victim in both a typical and non-typical hate crime scenario, as well as 
the impact of extra-legal factors on bias-motivated assault due to heterosexism. These 
studies shed 1ight U!)on the factors being taken into account by decision makers within the 
cowtroom (i.e., jurors) in cases of bias~mo6.vated assault. Taken together, these studies 
highlight implications for crimes of "hate" in the courtroom. 
Although previous stndies inve~tigating perceptions of hate crime noted that 
potential jurors viewed the typical hate crime as involving violence and including a 
member of a minority group (Craig & Vv'aldo, 1996), the current series of studies reveals 
that for a hate crime to simply involve ·1iolence and include a member of a minority 
group may not be typical enough for it to be viewed as a hate crime. Events surrounding 
the crime as well as characteristics of both the perpetrator and victim c1re important 
factors when considering attributions oftlame. 
The first hvo studies sought to explore the impact of t:J,.e labeling of a crime as 
hate onjuror perceptions and judgments of bias-motivated assat1lt. Study I focused on a 
typical hate crime scenario involving same-sex assault motivated by heterosexism. This 
study indicated no differences for the labeling of the crime. Study 2 focused on a non-
typical hate crime scenario involving opposite-sex assault motivated by gender. The 
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findings of study 2 howcv\!r did indicate a difference for ratings of guilt such that 
participants having to decide between. not guilty and guilty of a~sault in the first degree 
were more likely to choose guilty than those having to decide between not guilty and 
· guilty of bias-motivated assault due to gender. It is arguable that both scenarios fit the 
notion of assault in the first degree very well. The first study was also quite typical of 
people's notions of a hate crime and therefore fit that crime clru::sificationjust as well as 
assault in the firs' degree. The second study however wns assault motivated by gender (a 
category that is still being debated as to whether or not it should be included. in hai:e crime 
statutes),.a non-typical hate crime scenario. This study ~1id not fit the notion of hate 
crime as well and therefore generated differences in juror verdicts based on the labeling 
of the crime. 
AJthough the original hypotheses of studies I and 2 were not entil'ely supported, 
both studies served to highlight differences between a typical and non-typical hate crime 
scenario. In typical hate crime scena..-ios, it would seem that giving crimes the label of 
bias-motivated ratl:er than another label does not increase nor decrease the rate of 
conviction and may therefore serve to punish perpetrators of such crimes more harshly 
(i.e., Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancer61ent Act, 1993). For example, by r-harging 
someone with first-degree assault motivated by bias rather than first-degree assault it 
enhances the penalty that may be handed down were the defendant found guilty. It may 
be the case however that labeling crimes as bias-motivated that do not fit the typical 
notion of a h~te crime may actually be serving to decrease the conviction rate. Further 
studies are needed to explore the extent of '~ypicality" needed for a crime to be set:n as a 
hate crime as well as how decisions may be made ifjurors are given more than one fonn 
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of guilty option (i.e., guilty of R~sau!t in the first degree or g1Jilty of bia~-rnotivated 
assault or not guilty). 
Unlike the first two studies, study 3 sought to explore two extra-legal factors that 
were mentioned frequently in study 1 personal decision statemer ... ts (i.e., "it wis assadt, 
but it was provoked" and "he wasn ,t in a gay bar"). The scenario for study 3 involved a 
heterosexual man assaulting a gay man in either a loca~ bar or a gay bar (location) and the 
gay man either bought him a drink·and ·walked away or put his arm around him and ast~ed 
him to slow dance ("provocation"). Although nG differences were found in the guilt 
ratings between location and provocation, once again attributions of blame came into 
play. The location of the assnu1t mattered both for how much blame to attribute to the 
defenda11t as well as the victim. Participants reading the gay bar scenario attributed more 
blame to the defendant and less to the victim. "Provocatior" of the victim also made a 
ditforenc~ on how much blame Vi'as attributed to the victim. Those reading the scenario 
in which the victim put his f!nI' around the defendant and asked him to slow dance 
attributed more blam~ to the victim than those reading the scenario in which he simply 
buys the defendant a drink and walks away. 
Although according to their statements part~cipants seemed to cle:irly delineate 
between ~'provocation-present" ( e.g. "He made specifiG adwmces even when the 
defendant objected, provoking anger, which resulted in the clash" and "He was defending 
his personal space") and "provocation-absent" (e.g .. HThe victim realized the defendant 
was not interested and walked away JX>litely and then was attacked" and "No one saw the 
victim do anything wrong") this did not come into play ,:vhen deciding the guilt or 
innocence of 1he def~ndant. According to Kelley ( 1972), people will give more weight to 
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a facilitative cause (sornething that promotes that pruiicular · ·.;tmt) than to an inhibitory 
cause (something that would weaken or undennine that pan; ular event). Therefore even 
though participants identified the extent of "provocationt ti· ;~y may have been lending 
more weight to the "provocation-present" scenario when de,, :djng bet\veen guilty or not 
guilrv, generating no differences between the conditions. 
Aside from the extm-legal factors used. in study 3, p; ~icipants frequeritly made 
comments regarding the pres~nce of alcohol in the sccrior,o 1he assault in all studies 
tooJ~ place in a bar setting and although the transcript clearly states that the defendant was 
not intoxicaterl., many participants made reference to ; ne fact that the use of alcohol 
played .some role in foe assault. This 1.:!xtra-legal factoI" is certainly worthy of future note 
as other studies have pointed out the importance of .ikohol in violent crimes. For 
example, Richardson and Campbell (1980, 1982) fou:ii<l that attributions of blame ru•d 
responsibility in a violent encounter depended on th2- nerpetrator's consu..'!1ption nf 
alcohol. Similarly, Hammock and Richardson (1991 found that intoxica\ion may be the 
factor that both excuses the perpetrator's actions as v, :ll as serves ·i:o blame t.l1evictim in 
these types of settings (i.e., violent crimes). Stateme:ts made by parf icipants in the 
current series of studies indicated alcohol c;1s both a rcJ.son for the defendant's behavior a~ 
an excuse ( e.g., "Alcohol was involved which mixes with anger r.nd creates bad 
decisions" and "He lost control of his rage because he had been drinking") as \.Veil as 
poor decision on the part of the victim (e.g., '~She made a choice to drink, knowing it 
could affect her judgment" and '(Alcohol was involved on both sider"). 
Although attribution theory has been up plied in the 3rea of psychology and law in 
numerous ways, findings from study 1 did not show differences in nttribution of blame 
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based on the event presented in the transcript. lt may be the cac;e that potential jurors c:1rc 
relying on previously formed attitudes about the people involved in certain crimes. In 
fact, the area of hate crime is new even to the legal arena and being unsure of how the 
judgments for such crimes are made, jurors may be making attributions of blame or 
responsibility only after other avenues are exhausted. Moreover many of the statements 
participants made in thb series of studies aboui. Jegal and/or judicial terms were incorrect 
(i.e., intent wru, used to mean pre-meditation), pointing toward an even larger 
misunderstanding of the legal system as a whole. Future research may wantto examine 
this possibility. 
Admittedly, the procedure used in the present study limits how broadly the results 
can be generalized. Limitations of the current study include a homogenous participant 
sample (e.g., age, ethnicity, sexual orientation) and the use of alcohol in the transcript 
scenario (i.e., as a confound. variable). However it is worth noting that the jury 
simulation paradigm used was similar to other published research on jury decision 
mak.ing (Bornstein, 1999). Also of importance is the fact that the mock jurors used in this 
study w~re young college students, who may be mP.re libera. ~n their decision-making for 
these typ2s of crimes than older individuals. However, in $everal experiments comparing 
judgments of st...tdent and non-student samples, Finkel and ~olleagues found that althongh 
non-student samples tended to be older and more heterogeneous demogmphically, there 
were typically no differences in verdict or other factors at trial between student and r .:m-
student samples in jury simulation paradigms (Finkel & Duff, 1991; · Finkel & Handel, · 
l 989; Finkel, Hughes, Smith) & Hurabiell, 1994; Finkel, Hurabiell, & Hughes, 1993a, b; 
Finkel, Meister, & Lightfoot, 1991; Fulero & Finkel, 1991). Furthermore, ~!J participants 
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made statements regarding the facts of the case and n<1ne were excluded for containing 
inc,m·ect i11formation pertaining to the manipulations of the independent varinb]e (i.e., 
participants understood the facts of the case). Although the present results come from a 
laboratory-based study ihat employed college students to read a mock trial transcript they 
may have profound implications. Further research in this area is wa..rranted as the present 
studies demonstrate that there are not only stereotypes for victims of hate crime but that 
there may possibly be 1 notion of what events do and do not fit the "typical'~ idea of hate 
crime. This is important to legal and psychology scholars as well as fact-finders (i.e., 
jmiges and jurors) within the courtroom because if the event of the crime itself along with 
any present extra~legal factors have a larger effect on how judgments are made in these 
cases, knowledge about the specific factors at play may serve to be of great consequence. 
Conclusion 
Taken together, this series of studies provides a greater glimpse into the world of 
juror decision-making in some ca<;es of bias-motivated assault. Although attributions of , 
blame seem to come into play regarding the victim's role in these types of crimes, they 
do not lend themselves to ratings of guilt in typical hate crime scenarios. In non-typical 
hate crime scenarios however, ratings of guilt may stem from attributions of blame. 
Other factors affecting typical hate crime scenarios include extra-legnl factors such as 
previously held attitudes, location, and "provocation." ·Although. these studies are 
exploratory in nature, they do give ·distinct directions in which future research can be 
applied .. 
Many of the personal decision statements made in the hate crime conditions 
included the notion that jurors believed the defendant to be guilty but not of a hate crime 
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(i.e.~ "I believe he should be convicted of something but ealling it a hate crime would be 
too much"). Future studies should in'!estigate how ratings of guilt may be affected when 
given more than one type of guilty clioice in cases of hate crime (i.e., not gui]ty vs. guilty 
of assault in the first degree vs. guilty of assault motivated by bias). Other areas for 
future study may include differential types of hate crime scenarios ( e.g., a heterosexual 
person assaulted for supporting gay rights), gender dyads ( e.g., a man assaulting a 
lesbian), as well as additional extra-legal factors (e.g., perceptions of the role of alcohol 
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Note: This transcript depicts the condition in which participants will read about a same-
sex attack by a man against a gay man that has been labeled "assault motivated by bias or 
a hate crime". 
*Names that will be changed depending upon condition appear in italics. 
* *Definition and/or explanation of ihe crime label that will be changed depending upon 
condition will appear in bold italics. 
~Judge's OpeningStatement 
Judge: Good afternoon. This proceeding is a trial of the defendant, Mr. Daniel Smith, 
who has been charged with assault motivated by bias or a hate crime perpetrated against 
Mr. James Grear. Mr. Smith is being prosecukd by the District Attorney's office for 
committing assault motivated by bias or a hate crime against Mr. Grear. Mr. Smith will 
be represented by his lawyer. We will hear opening statements from the prosecution and 
defense: TI1is will be followed by direct examination of the prosecution's witnesses and 
cross examination by the defense .. Direct examination of the defense witnesses and cross 
examination of those witnesses by the prosecution will follow. Each will give closing 
statements. 
The issue at this trial is whether Mr. Smith committed assault motivated by bias or a hate 
crime against Mr. Grear during the evening of May 29th, 2004 at a downtown 
Minneapolis, MN bar. The defendant pleaded not guilty. Before the defendant can be 
convicted, the State must prove all the essential elements of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The fact that the defendant has been charged with a criminal offense is 
not evidence and must not be considered by you as evidence. 
Assault motivated by bias is defined by this state in the following statute: 
609.221 Great bodily harm. Whoever assaults another with intent to inflict great bodily 
harm may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years m to payment of a 
fine of not more than $30,000, or both. Plus: 
Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act (28 U.S.C 994) 
Congress enacted afederal complement to state hate crime penalty-enltancement 
statutes in the .1994 crime bill. This provision required the United States Sentencing 
Commission to increase the pena!tiesfor crimes i11 wlticl, the "''ictim was selected 
"because of the actual or perceived race, cu/or, religion, national origin, ethuicity, 
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gender, df~ability, or sexual orientation of any perso11." 11ds measure applies to attack'i 
and vandalism which occur in natio1tal parks and on federal property. 
609.2231 Assaults motivated by bias. (a) Whoever assaults another because of the 
victim's or another's actual or perceived race, color, religion9 sex:, sexual orientation, 
disability as defined in sectimi 363A.03, age, or ru:Honal origin may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for not more than one year or to payme11t of a fine of not more than 
$3,000, or both. · 
363A.03 Sexual orientation. "Sexual orientation'1 means having or being perceived as 
having an emotional, physical, or sexual attachment to another person without regard 
to the sex of that person or having or being perceived as having an orientation for 
sue/, attachment, or having or being perceived as ha1,i11g a self-image or identity not 
traditionally associated with one~s- bio/cgical maleness or femaleness. "Sexual 
orientation" does not include a physical or sexual attachment to children by an adult. 
After all evidence has been heard, you wil! be required to vote on the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. 
Prosecution's OpeningStatcment 
Membe:rs of the jury, Mr. Grear will teUyou how Mr. Smith assaulted him without 
provocation or apparent r~gard for anyone in his way. He will also tell you how lifr. 
Smith shouted slanderous and derogatory remarks tr. ward him during this attack. Mr. 
Grear along with two other witnesses at the bar that evening will testify to the horrific 
nature of the crime. This~ ladies and gentlemen, is a clear case of assault motivated by 
bias. Tlzfr crime is a hate crime given Hte reason Mrft Grear was attacked is because of 
his perceived sexual orientation. 
Defense's Opening Statement 
Members of the jury, my client, Mr. Smith has been charged with assault motivated by 
bias. We will show that there is no evidence whatsoever to find Mr. Smith guilty of a 
hate crime. Instead, we will show that lv.fr. Smith was merely defending himself against 
the unwanted sexual advances of Mr. Grear and did not intend to cause bodily harm. 
This case d-::.-:::s not constitute assault motivated by bias. 
Judge: Prosecution, call your first witness. 
Prosecution: 111e state calls Mr. James Grear to the stand. 
Prosecution Direct Examination of Mr. Grear 
P: Mr. Grear cnn you tell us in your own words what happened the night of May 29L", 
2004? 
JG: Yes. Some friends of mine and I decided to go out, have a few drinks, a little fun, 
nothing too crazy, maybe a littl0 dancing. We went to this place {'d never been to before, 
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the********. It was pretty nice when we first got there, we had a drink and my friends 
went out on the dance floor to dance. I decided to wa'tk around and see if there were any 
interesting people, you kno""· Um; then when my friends crune back I was pointing out 
this guy that had smiled atme while I was walking around. I said that I thought he was 
pretty cute. My friends encouraged me to go talk to him but I was too shy at first. I 
passed by him again later on and he smiled and nodded so I said "hi" and just kept 
walking. I wish I would have left at that point. 
P: So what happened next, Mr. Grear? 
JG: I finally got up the courage to go talk to him. I walked over when he was only 
talking to one other person ... I didn't want to interr" r~ their conversation so I waited. I 
said "hello'' and asked him ifI could buy him a dti.nk. He seemed a little surprised at 
first, but then he said "sure". After I introduced myself we talked about what we do for a 
living, for fun, you know, just trying to get to know each other, I thought ... then a slow 
song came on, one that I really like. I asked him to dance. He pulled away from me and 
when he turned back around he punched me in the stomach. I was so surprisca that I just 
stood there. The bar was so crowded that I don't think anyone even saw what had 
happened. Then he started yelling at me, things like, "I don't dance withfags" and 
"Keep your queer hands off me, you homo". Then he just started hitting me over and 
over again. I backed away and put my arms up, but I couldn't go very far, there were too 
many people for me to get away from him quickly. At some point I fell to the gronnd and 
the crowd sort of gathered around me and just watched him hitting anci kicking me. 
Some girl got hit in the process of trying to get in the way of his punches. Eventually I 
blacked out and don't remember anything until I woke up in the emergency room at the 
hospital. 
P: Did Mr. Smith use a weapon of any sort, other than his fist when he was hitting you? 
JG: I don't know. I remember that he had a drink in his hand and I was told at the 
hospital that they pulled glass c~t of my arms, but I'm not sure if he hit me with the glass, 
or if there was just glass on the floor when I fell or what. 
. P: What injuries were you treated for at the hospital? 
JG: I had two broken ribs, a broken finger, a broken nose, a concussion, and many cuts 
and bruises. 
P: Did you receive any stitches for the cuts? 
JG: Yes. All together I got 150 stitches in my face, neck, head, and arms. 
P: Mr. Grear, why do you think Mr. Smith attacked you? 
JG~ I'm not sure. Everything seemed fine and then all ofa sudden he just lost it. From 
the things he was yelling at me, I would say that I was at.tacked because I am a gay man. 
69 
P: Mr. Grear, do you think this was a hate crime? 
JG: Yes, definite(v. 
P: Thank you Mr. Grear. No further questions. 
Defense Cross Examination of Mr. Grear 
D: Mr. Grear, you just testified that you are a gay man. Was the bar you were at 
considered a gaybar? 
JG: No, I guess not. 
D: Wou]d you s&y that you were ''hitting on'' Mr. Smith at this bar? 
JG: No. I mean, I thought he was attract;:.'e and I was curious if he was interested or 
not, but I didn~t ask for his number or ask him out for a date or anything like that. 
D: But you did ask him to slow dance with you? 
JG: Yes. 
D: When you were speaking with lvlr. Smith before asking him to dance did you touch 
him in any way? · 
JG: I suppose I probably touched his arm when I was talking to him. It was loud in the 
bar with the mu:5ic and everything so we had to stand very close to carry on a 
conversation. 
D: Did Mr. Smifh touch you at all during this conversation? 
JG: I don't remember. 
D: What was your intentionin speaking with Mr. Smith and asking him to dance? 
JG: I guess to find out if he was interested in me or not. 
D: Interested how? Sexua1ly? 
JG: Romantically maybe, but not sexually. For a possible date. I wasn't t:r;ing to take 
anyone home Vvith me that night. 
D: Couldn't you have just asked him if he was interested from the start of the 
conversation? 
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,: I suppose, that just seems a little awkward. 
Jvfr. Grear have you approached men in bars that you know t0 not he considered g«Y 
bars before? 
JG: Yes . 
.D: And how have these men responded to your advances? 
JG: Depends. Sometimes 1 get a date. Sometimes they say "no thank you". Sometimes 
they get lipset and tell me to "fuck-off'. 
D: So you haven't always been met with approval in these types of s~ttings? 
. JG: No. But I don't think anyone always is. 
D: Jsn 'tit a greater risk to you101owing that the person you 're hitting on may not be 
gay? 
JG: I don't think it makes a difference. If you're not h'.1terested, you're not interested, 
regardless of sexual orientation. It's a risk everyone taJces if they're trying to find out if 
someone's interested in them or not. 
D: You testified that at some point you passed out and don't remember anything after 
that, correct? 
JG: Yes. 
D: Is it p0ssible that someone other than my client may have attacked you? 
JG: I only saw Mr. Smith hit me. 
D: What about after you passed out? 
JG: I guess it's possible. 
D: Thank you. · No further questions. 
Prosecution Direct Examination of Witness #1: Mr. Alun Davis - Bartender 
P: Mr. Davis, were you working at the ********on the night of May 29th, 2004? 
AD: Yes, I was tending bar at the South entrance. 
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P: Can you tell me if you recognize the victim, Mr. Grear and defcnd:rn1 .\,fr. S'mith 
from that evening? 
AD: Yes. I remember both quite well. 
P: Can you tell the court what you saw happen that night? 
AD: Well, I didn't notice them talking or anything until they ordered drinks from me, 
A1r. Grear is actually the one who ordered both drinks. After that I didn't pay much 
attention to them, other than to notice that theywere talking. A while later l heard i"vfr. 
Smith yelling at Mr. Grear. At first I assumed they were a couple having a fight and then 
I saw Mr. Smith punching Mr. Grear. I immediattly called for bouncers to come break it 
up and tried to get around the bar to help Mr. Grear who was lying on the floor by now. 
I saw Mr. Smith punch and kick him repeatedly. I saw some girl in the crowd try to break 
it up and she got hit as well. By the time the bouncers got through the crowd it was 
obvious that Mr. Grear was not conc.;cious so I called the ambulance right away. Then I 
helped try to clear the crowd out and waited near Mr. Grear until the EMTs arrived. 
P: Did you hear anything that was said between .Mr. Grear and the defendant? 
AD: I only heard what Mr. Smith was yeliing. 
P: What did you hear Mr. Smith yell? 
AD: He called Mr. Grear a}Clg and told him to keep his queer hands off him. 
P: Did you see anyone else hit or kick Mr. Grear? 
AD: No, not that I could tell through the crowd. 
P: Did you see Mr. Grear hit M,~. Smith in an attempt to fight back or ?thenvise? 
AD: No. 
P: Thank you Mr. Davis. 
Defense Cross Examination. of Witness #1: Mr. Alan Davis - Bartender 
D! Mr. Davis, how long have you worked at the********? 
AD: Three years. 
D: Have you seen numy fights in your bar in those three year~? 
AD: I guess so. Fights occur I'd say about once every couple of weeks. 
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D: Anyone ever taken to the hospital? 
AD= Yes ... it's our policy to caHan ambulance if there is any blood or if anyone is 
unconscious. 
D: Did you hear the conversation between A1r. Grear and my client, Mr. Smith? 
AD: No, I didn't hear anything they were taJking about until ltf,. Smith starting yeilins 
obscenities at Mr. Grear. 
D: Thank you Mr. Davis. No further questions. 
Prosecution Direct Examination of 'Witness #2: Ms. Isabel Salva 
P: Ms. Salva, w~re ~'C'J at the ******:t :~ the night ofMay 29th, 2004? 
IS: Yes. 
P: Did you see Mr. Grear and tht~ defendant there that night? 
IS: Yes I did. 
P: Can you tell the court what you sav .. 1 relevant to these proceedings that evening? 
IS: I was standing at the bar neau\1r. Smith most of the evening. I saw J\,Jr. Grear come 
over and start talking to hbn. Then he started to yell at him. I got kind of nervous 
because I was standing so close that I couldn't move out of the way when he sort of 
shoved him. Then Mr. Smith just starting hitting and kicking him. After he fell to the 
ground, I could see he was bleeding and no one was trying to help, so I stepped in the 
way of Mr. Smith md tried to get him to stop. I kept telling him "it's not worth it, you'll 
get arrested". But then he hit me and kept kicking Mr. Grear. 
P: Did you sustain any injuries as a result of trying to help Mr. Grear? 
IS: Yes, I had a cut above my eye that I had to get stitches for at the hospitaJ. 
P: Did you see anyone else hit or kick Mr. Grear? 
IS: No. 
P: Why do you think M'r. Smith was attacking Mr. Grear? 
IS: Because he's gay. 
P: What made you think that was the reason? 
73 
IS: Becaus~ of what he wns yelling nt him. lie kept calling him afag and rt q1Jeer nm 1 
stt{!f like that. 
P: Jfs. Salva, would consider this to be a :.:ri.te crime? 
IS: Yes. 
P: Thank you, no further questions, 
Defense Cross Examination of Witness #2: Ms. Isabel Salva 
D: Ms. Salva, you testified that you had been at the bar for a while that night, correct? 
IS~ Yes. 
D: Were you drinking alcohol at the bar that night? 
IS: Yes. I had a few drinks. 
D: Would you say you were intoxicated at the time the fight broke out? 
IS: Um, probably. They wouldn't let me drive home from the hospital because I was 
over the legal limit. 
D: Did you hear ~Mr. Grear ask my client to dance? 
IS: No. But I did hear him ask .Mr. Smith if he could buy him a drink. 
D: How would you describe my client's behavior after the fight broke out? 
IS: It was scary. Like he didn't even see or hear me when I was trying to talk to him. 
He just kept hitting and kicking, like he was in a trance or something. He seemed very 
angry. 
D: Thank you Ms. Salva. 
Defense Direct Examination of Defendant: Mr. Smith 
D: Mr. Smith, can you please tell the court in your own words what happened the night 
of May 29th, 2004 at the******** in Minneapolis? 
DS: Yes. I went out with a couple of friends to a different club at first, they were trying 
to set me up with this chic, but I wasn ~t interested 30 we left. When we got to the 
* * * * * * * * I had already had a few drinks, we. were just having a good time. Then this 
man comes up to me and asks if he can buy me a drink. I noticed earlier that he was with 
a couple of cute girls so I thought maybe one of them \Vas interested lmd sent their friend 
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over to talk to me. So he starts h .. "1king me all these questions about myself then he starts 
touching my arm and Jeaning in closer to talk to me. I started to get a little 
uncomfortable so I backed up next to the bar a bit. Then he asks me to dance to a slow 
song and I realized that he was hitting on me! Well I'm no fag, so I told him that and I 
guess I must of hit him wh~n I turned around. But he still wouldn't leave. He was 
completely freaking me out. I thought he was going to grab me and try to kiss me or 
something and then I just lost it. I mean he obviously wouldn't take "no" for an answer. 
D: Wnat happened then? 
DS: I don't remember. I just flipped out and I can kind of remember yelling and then 
when the bouncers grabbed me I remember seeing him lying on the ground ... but all the 
stuff in between was just anger. Iju~t wanted him to leave me alone. 
D: Why didn't you just tell him you weren't interested? 
DS: I did. I told him to get his hands off me, but he still wouldn,t leave. 
D: Did you intend to harm .Mr. Grear? 
DS: No, I just felt scared and wanted him to go away. 
D: Do you remember hitting Ms. Salva? 
DS: No. I don't r~member seeing her there at all. 
D: Were you surprised that Mr. Grear asked you to dance? 
DS~ Hell yeah. We weren't in a gay bar or anything ... muybe if we were I would've 
expected it or something, but I thought he was asking me questions for one of his friends. 
D: Thank you J..,fr~ Smith, no further questions. 
Prosecution Cross Exsmination of Dtfendant: !rlr. Smith 
P: ft.1r. Smith you said that you had a.lready had a couple of drinks before you got to the 
********, ~orrect? 
DS: Yes. 
P: Did you have too much to drink thatnight? 
DS: I don't know,, I mean I wasn~t wasted or anything. 
P: You testified that you don't remember part of the evening. Did you black out? 
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DS: I guess so . 
.P: If you don't think you had too much to drink, what do you think caused you to black 
out? 
DS: I'm not sure, I was pretty pissed off: maybe I was just too angry. 
P: Do you hate gay men? 
DS: No. I don't hate them. I don't agree with their lifestyle, but as long as they don't 
push it on me, they 're fine. 
P:. Did you feel that Mr. Grear was pushing his "lifestyle" on you that evening? 
DS: Yes, He was hitting on me. 
P: Ard this made you angry? 
DS: \Vell, more like scared. 
P~ But you blacked out because you were angry? 
DS: \Vhen he hlt on me I was scared, but when he wouldn't leave me alone, I got angry. 
P: 1 see. Mr. Smith you said that you were at a different bar earlier where you were not 
jnterested in someone else. Did this person scare you as well? 
DS: No. 
P: So you didn't get angry at her and hit her? 
DS: No. 
P: Why didn't she scare you? 
DS: Because she was a woman ... not a gay guy. 
P: After l\1r. Grear fell to the floor and became unconscious why did you continue to hit 
h . '? im. 
DS: I don't remember doing that. 
P: Do you conskler yourself to be homophobic A1r. Smith? 
DS: No, I have a couple of JNends whu are gay. 
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P: But ifa gay-man· hits.on you this makes you feel scared? 
o··s: Yeah·, IJ.ust diqn:'tknow what to do. 
. . . . . 
. P:· .. ·Ybu couldn't think of anbther way to. ha!idle the situation other than beating him to.··. 
: the point of unconsciousness and..later. hosp~talization'? ' . . . ' . . 
. , .. ' . ' . . ' 
D~~ I. already said I don'fremember doing that. · 
P: Mr. Smith do you· tl,ink tliis W(JS a /,ate crime.? 
'·DS:· No way, I don't hate people just because they're -different than ffl!!, even if[ don't. 
·. agree _with \~,hat t~e)J do. . . 
-'P: Thank_you. No further questions. 
· D.efcnse·. Direct Exa~ination of ~witness' #3:· Mr. Alex Ha.rris - Friend 
D: Jvfr. Harr#, can you please tell us·how you know the defendanp. 
AH: Dan and I are· goqd frienqs. ·w e'-ve known each other for .about four years.· 
' . 
. : D::· ·Were ·you out ·wi~h lvfr. Smith jlie night of May 29th? 
. ' . 
AS: ·Yes.· 
. ' . . ' 
·. ·. D: Did you see him talking with Mr. Grear? 
AH:. Yes. 
. ' 
D: How would you descnbe his actions after tlie fight. broke out? 
A:Jf:· l've never seen him.like that.. Fie seemed completely freaked out.· 
·D: Have )'OU ever seen him in a fig~t before? 
. ' 
. . ' .. 
AH: No, never ... He can always find a reason to walk away. 
:o: Why .do you .. think this fight happened? 
. . ,, 
~H:· I don't know .. It had:to be something big .for him to go off like that. 
D: What kind of.person would y~u characterize Mr. Sn1ith to be?·. 
. . ' ' . . . 
Al-I:' A good person; He is very caring; loyal, and he loves ·his family~. He's just an all-
.. around great friend. 
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D: Wou]d you consider _Mr. Smith to be homophobic?· 
. ' . ,, . . ' . 
AH: No. I've never heard'hl'm say~a bad thin·g about homosexuals. .. 
. D: Thank you lvfr.. Harr1s .. 
Prosec.ution Cross· Examination of Witness #3: · Mr. Alex Harris - Fri.e~d 
P: Afr. Harris, you.have known the defendant for four years and he.b~ never been in a 
. fight.t~at. yo~ ~ow of? . . . . . . . 
.. AH.: Nothing bigger.than.ah argument. 
. . . ' 
. ' . . . '. . 
P:· .. You said t~athe·."freakedout", what do you mean by that?. 
AH: He just didn't seem like hi.mse(f; like he was in a rage or something. 
P: To.your knowledge has·J\,1r. Smith ever been hit pn bya member of the same sexprior . . 'ti . . . . . 
to .May 29 1.? :. . · . . · · . . · . . . . . 
AH:.Yeah; at .a gay barwe went to with somefemalefrien.ds once 
P: And how did'/w react in tha( situation? 
AH: /le seemed, fine. He made jokes about it and we sort of teased him a little. 
P: He made:jokes about it? .What kind of jokes? · 
AH: Nothing bad, just how he's hot enough to attract members of both sexes. Stuff like 
that. ., 
P: Was he polite to the person that hit on him then? · 
. . ' . ' 
. · AH: Yeah .. i-Ie ju.st ·said he was straight and the man left him alone. 
P: Mr. Smith testified that he disagrees with the lifestyle of gay men and.lesbians. Wny 
wouldhe go to a gay bar? . 
AH: We went for a friend's birthday party. 
. . 
P: . Mr. Harris, why didn't you do anything to stOp the attack on Mr. Grear th.at night? . 
AH: At first I didn't know what was happening and I wasn't sure· why the fight had . 
. started in the first'place. After he fell to the ground I tried to get over to Dan to talk him 
down, but the cro.wd was too full and I couldn't get through~ . 
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P: Thank yo,1. No fm•her questions. 
Prosecution Closing Statement 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, there is no dispute that Mr. Smith violently attacked 
Mr. Grear the night of May 29th, 2004. All of the witnesses here, including )\!fr. Smith's 
own friend, saw him and only him, hit and kick Afr. Grear repeatedly. Afr. Grear 
incurred a number of ii\juries and spent a few days in the hospital as a resuJt of this 
attack. Both Mr. Grear and two other witnesses testified to the slanderous and 
derogatory remarks that he shouted toward his victim before and during the attack. 
Ladies and gentlemen, this clearly shows intent on the part of Mr. Smith to illl4.ict hann 
on his victim. After hearing the words that were shouted during the attack, there should 
be no doubt that Mr. Smith is guilty of assault motivated by bias and according to the 
hate crime sentencing enhanceme11t act, should be punished accordingly. Thank you for 
your time. 
Defense Closing Statement 
Jury members, although others present that evening say they witnessed my client 
attacking Mr. Grear, he does not remember that at all. Ladies and gentlemen, my client 
was so frightened and eventually ~ngered by the actions of Mr. Grear that he simply 
reacted poorly to a bad situat~on. My client,Mr. Smith did not intend to harm Mr. Grear. 
His only intention was to defend himselfagainst the sexual advances of a gay man. This 
case lacks the intent needed to constitute assault. Furthermore, tltis case is not a hate 
crime as my clie11t did not seek out Mr. Grear hecatJSe he was gay. He simply wanted 
him to leave him alone. I am certain that you will find my client, Mr. Smith not guilty. 
Thank you. 
Judge's Closing Statement 
Members of the jury, you have heard all the arguments presented by both the District 
Attorney and defense lawyer and are now required to come to a decision regarding the 
gailt or innocence of Mr. Smith. 
Jury members are reminded that in order to find Mr. Smith guilty of assault motivated by 
bias or a hate crime, there must be sufficient evidence that there was intent to inflict 
great bodily harm to tlae victim a11d t/,at tl,e victim in thi.~ case was assaulted because of 
his actual or perceived sexual orie11tation. The State must prove all of the essential 
elements of the crime charged by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The State is not 





This questionnaire is designed to measure the way you feel about associating with gay 
men and/or lesbians. It is not a test, so thereis no right or wrong at13wers. Answer each 
item as carefully and accurately as you can by placing a number in the blank at the 
beginning of each question according to the following scale: 
l Strongly agree 
2 Agree somewhat 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree somewhat 
5 Strongly disagree 
___ 1. I would enjoy attending social functions at which gay men and/or lesbians were 
present. 
___ 2. I would feel uncomfortable if I learned that my neighbor was gay. 
__ 3. If a member of my own sex made a sexual advance toward me I would feel 
angry. 
___ 4. I would feel comfortable knowing that I was attractive to members of my own 
sex. 
____ 5. I would feel uncomfortable being seen in a gay bar. 
___ 6. I would feel comfortable if a member of my sex made an advance toward me. 
__ 7. I would be comfortable if I found myself attracted to a member of my own sex. 
__ 8. I would feel disappointed ifl learned that my child was gay. 
__ 9. I would feel nervous being in a group of gay men and/or lesbjans. 
__ 10. I would feel comfortable knowing that my clergyman/woman was gay. 
__ 11. I would be upset if I learned that my brother or sister was gay. 
___ 12. I would feel that I had failed a<:> a parent if I learned that my child was gay. 
-·- 13. Ifl saw two men holding hands in public I would feel disgusted. 
__ 14. If a member of my sex made an advance toward me I would be offended. 
15. I would feel comfortable ifl learned that my daughter's teacher was a lesbian. 
__ 16. I would feel uncomfortable if I learned that my spouse or partner was attracted 
to members of his or her own sex. 
__ 17. I would feel at ease talking with a gay person at a party; 
___ 18. I would feel uncomfortable kissing a close friend of my own sex in public. 
----~ 19. It would not bother me to walk through a predominantly gay section of town. 
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__ 20. lt would disturb me to find out that my doctor was gay. 
__ 21. I would feel comfortable if I leamed that my best friend of my own sex was 
gay. 
____ 22. If a member of my own sex made an advance toward me I would feel flattered. 
___ 23. I would feel uncomfortable knowing that my son's male teacher was gay. 
Demographic Questionnaire 
Please provide the following information: 
Age:. 
Sex: ___ Female 
__ Male 
__ Prefer not to say 
Race: __ African American/ Black 
___ Asian American 
__ Caucasion I W ~...ite 
__ Hispanic 
__ Native American 
___ Other; _____ . ____ _ 






__ Prefer not to say 
Level of Education: 




__ Grad Student 
__ Other/Prefer not to say 
. '
4Home" state (i.e., state in which you have lived most of your life): _______ _ 
State Y'-)u live in now: __ _ 
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Individual Juror Ve.r<lict 
Juror Number:·---
On the basis of the evidence, my vote is that Daniel Smith is: 
Guilty of Assault motivated by bias (hate crime) 
Not-guilty ____ _ 
Private Belief Rating Scale 
Juror# ------
With this questionnaire, you are being asked to circle the one number that best describes 
your private belief that Daniel Smith should or should not be convicted of assault. You 
are not being asked to state whether you believe there is sufficient evidence to convict in 
a court. of law. Rather, it is asking about your persona] and private belief. 
Please circle one number that best describes your private belief about whether Daniel 
Smith should or should not be convicted. 
-5 -4 -3 
Certain Daniel Smith 
Should NOT BE 
Convicted 
Juror Number: -----
-2 -1 0 
Perceptions 
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Certain Daniel Smith 
SHOULD BE 
Convicted 
· Given the following rating scale, please indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with the following statements. · 
Strongly 
Disagree 









___ 2. The defendant is solely to blame for the events that took place in the bar that 
evemng. 
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3. The defendant's actions are not the results 0f the victim's sexual micntation. 
4. The defendant's actions were reasonable. 
5. The victim should know to be more careful about approaching someone 
whose sexual orientation is unknown. 
___ 6. The defendant's actions were the result of unwanted advances by the victim. 
____ 7. The defendant deliberately intended to inflict injury on the victim. 
8. The defendant's actions were under his control. 
9. The defendant was provoked. 
10. The defendant's actions were justified. 
11. The victim deserved it. 
12.. Any reasonable man would have acted the same as the defendant. 
13. The defendant is mentally unstable. 
__ 14. The victim is mentally unstable. 
15. The defendant committed a hate crime. 
Personal Decision 
Juror# -~-----
l. Please list, as briefly as possible, the reasons for your personal decision in this case. 
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Appendix C 
Informed Consent Form: Perceptions of Crime 
My name is Karyn P]umm, ram conducting a study under the supervision of Dr. Cheryl 
Terrance, a professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of North Dakota, to 
examine people's perceptions of crime. Tliis study will take approximately 1 to 2 hours to 
complete. 
Y 011 are invited t~. participate in a study in which we will ask you to read a transcript of a 
simulated criminal trial wherein the defendant is being accused of assaulting a person in a public 
bar setting. As prut of the study you will as well be asked to respond to questionnaires pertaining 
to your views about the case, and the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
The benefits from this research will be a better understanding of how people render 
decisions in similar cnses. Specific benefits to you for your participation will be a better 
understanding of what psychologic~J research is about. As compensation for your participation 
you wiJI have the opportunity to earn extra credit in your current psychology class. Some people 
may find the issues involved in this crimina] trial to be offensive and/or upsetting, and you are 
under no obligation to continue with the study. Should you feel upset to the degree that you need 
assistance, contact numbers for agencies have been provided at the bottom of this const!nt form. 
Services listed are free of charge. Any charges for services that may arise are the responsibility 
of the participant. · 
Some participants may focl a little apprehensive because this is an evaluative situaticn, or 
may feel anxious responding to questions pertaining to personally sensitive issues. You do not 
have to respond to any questions that you do not want to, and all data will remain confidential and 
anonymous with respect to your personal identity: To insure privacy concerns, participants will 
be given numerical identification numbers for processing the data and your names will not be 
revealed in presentation or publication of the study. Only the researcher, her advisor, research 
assistants, and people who audit IRB procedures v,1ill have access to the data. Questionnaires will 
be stored separately from consent fonns in a locked cabinet in Dr. Terrance's research lab for a 
minimum period of 3 years. 
Participation is volunta1y. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect 
your future relations with UNO. If you decide to participate, you are fre~ to discontinue 
participation at any time without prejudice. A copy ofthi~ consent form will be made available to 
you. If you have any questions about this research, you may ask Karyn Plumm at 777-4779. 
Alternatively, you may contact Dr. Cheryl Terrance at 777-3921. If you have any other questions 
or concerns, p1~ase caJI Research Development and Compliance at 777-4279. · 
I have read all of the above and willingly agree to participate in this study. 
ParticipanCs Name 
Contact Information: 
University of North Dakota Counseling Center 






Classification Schema; Study 1 
Statements mad1 JY participants·from the Personal Decision questionnaire were classified 
into six types ( .. arguments used to support their decision in the case. This table provides 
· examples of statementE: made. 
1. LegaJ Arguments 
"She is guilty. It was not self-defense." 
HHe kept hitting and kicking him with intent to harm him." 
Not Guilty 
"I feel it is not a hate crime because he did not seek him out based on his 
sexual orientation, he just dealt with the situation vrrongly." 
"The evidence in the trial did not prove her intent to assault her." 
2. Physical Evidence 
Guilty 
"She was yelling at her using derogatory terms in reference to her sexual 
orientation." 
'~He beat him repeatedly even while he was unconscious." 
Not Guilty 
"She said she did not like her touching her but no one could prove she was 
acting out." 
"She asked her to leave her alone." 
3. Morality Statements 
Guilty 
"Gays shoukl not be persecuted for who they are." 
~'Violence never solves anything, walking away is an option." 
Not Guilty 
"I would have acted almost. the same if a guy after saying no wouldn't 
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leave me alone. I wouidn ~t hit him that much though." 
"I probably would have reacted likewi~c.~' 
4. Victim .. Related Statement~ 
Guilty 
HShe clearly attacked her because she was a lesbian." 
"He did not mean to off'~nd him by hitting on him.'~ 
Not Guilty 
"The victim wouldn't take n0 for an answer." 
"The victim 'pushed it'." 
5. Witness and/or Perpetrator Credibility 
Guilty 
"Her account for what happened was BS." 
"Even though he can't remember, there were witnes~.es to prove his 
actions.n 
Not Guilty 
"It was a one-time incident. His previous record showed he wasn't 
abusive to homosexuals." 
"He's considered a great guy." 
6. Extra-Legal :Factors 
Guilty 
"Even though she was intoxicated she had a sense of what she was doing.'" 
"She wasn't physically provoked.'' 
Not Guilty 
"He wasn't in a gay bar." 




Note: This transcript depicts the condition in which participants wilI read about an 
opposite-sex attack by a man against a woman that has been labeled "assault motivated 
by bias or a hate crime". 
*Names that will be changed depending upon condition appear in italics. 
**Definition and/or explanation of the crime label that will be changed dep~nding upon 
condition will appear in bold italics. 
Judge's Opening Statement 
Judge: Good afternoon. This proceeding is a trial of the defendant, Mr. Daniel Smit.1, 
who has been charged with assault motivated by bias or a hate crime perpetrated against 
Ms. Jane Grear. Mr. Smith is being proscc~ted by the District Attorney's office for 
committing assault motivated by bias or a hate crime against Ms. Grear. Afr. Smith will 
be represented by his lawyer. We will hear opening statements from the prosecution and 
defense. This will be followed by direct examination of the prosecution's witnesses and 
cross examination by the defense. Direct examination of the defense witnes~~s and cross 
examination of those witnesses by the prosecution ,vill follow. Each will give closing 
statements. 
The issue at this trial is whether Mr. Smith committed assault motivated by bias or a hate 
crime against .1.Ms. Grear during the evening of May 29th, 2004 at a downtown 
Minneapolis, MN bar. The defendant pleaded not guilty. Before the defendant can be 
convicted, the 'State must prove all the essential elements of thP '"r+~::.:: !::~·:,uu a 
reasonable doubt. The fact that the defendant has been charged with a criminal offense is 
not evidence and must not be considered by you as evidence. 
Assa,l.lt motivated by bias is defined by this state in the following statute: 
609.221 Great bodily harm. \Vhoever assaults another \\iith intentto inflict great bodily 
harm may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a 
fine of not more than $30,000, or both. Plus ... 
Hate Crime Sentencing Enha11ceme11t Act (28 U.S.C 994) 
Congress enacted a.federal complement to state hate crime pe11a'ity-enhallceme11t 
statutes in the 1994 crime hill. This provision required the United States Sentencing 
Comm1:\'Sim1. to increase the penalties for crimes in whiclt the victim was selected 
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"hecause of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, nationalorigin, ethnicity, 
gender, disability, or sexual oriet;fation of any person~" This mearnre applies to attacks 
and vandalism which occur in rwtional parks and on federal property, 
60Y.2231 Assau/ts motivated by bias. (a) Whoever assaults another because of lite 
victim's or another's actual or perceived race, cu/or, religion, sex, sexual orientation, 
disahllity as defined in section 363A.03, age, or natio11al origin may be sentenced to 
irnprisonmentfor not more titan one year or to payment of a.fine of not more than 
$31.000, or both. 
After all evidence has been heard, you will be required to vote on the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. 
Prosecution's Opening Statement 
Members of the jury, Ms. Grear ,vill tell you how Afr. Smith assaulted her without 
provocation or apparent regard for anyone in his way. She will also tell you how Mr 
Smith shouted slande .. ous and derogatory remarks toward her during this attack. Ms. 
Grear a~ :ng with two other witnesses at the bar that evening will testify to the horrific 
nature of the crime. This, ladies and gentlemen) is a clear case of assault motivated by 
bias. Tltis crime is a ltate cri1ne given tlte reason Ms. Grear was attacked is because of 
her sex. (gender). 
Defense's Opening Statement 
Members of the jury, my client, A1r. Smith has been charged with assault motivated by 
bias. We will show that there is no evidence whatsoever to find lvfr. Smith guilty of a 
!tale crime. Instead, we will show that Mr. Smith was merely defending himself against 
the unwanted sexual advances of Afs. Grear and did not intend to cau.se bodily hann. 
This case does not constitute assault motivated by bias. 
Judge: Prosecution, caJl your first witness. 
Prosc.cution: The state calls Ms. Jane Grear to the stand. 
Prosecution Direct Examination of Ms. Grear 
P: .,\Ifs. Grear can you tell us in your own words what happened the night of May 29t\ 
2004? 
JG: Yes. Some friends of mine and I decided to go out, have a few drinks, a little fun, 
nothing too crazy, maybe a little dancing. We went to this plac~ I'd never been to before, 
the * * * * * * * *. It was pretty nice when we first got there, we had a drink and my friends 
went out on the <lane~) floor to dance. I decided to walk around and see if there were any 
interesting people, you know. Um. then when my friends ca.me back I was pointing out 
this guy that had smiled at me while I was walking around. I said that I thought he was 
pretty cute. My friends encouraged me to go talk to him but I was too shy atfirst. I 
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passed by him again later on and he smiled and nodded so I said ''hi" and just kept 
walking. I wish I would have left at that point. 
P: ·so what happened next, Ms. Grear? 
JG: I finally got up the courage to go talk to him. I walked over when he was only 
talking to one other person ... I didn't want to interrupt their conversation so I waited. I 
said Hhello" and asked him if I could buy him a drink. He seemed a little surprised at 
first, but then he said "sure". After I introduced myself we talked about what we do for a 
living, for fun, you know, just trying to get to know eac:1 other, I thought. .. then a slow 
song came on, one that I really like. I asked him to· d~uice. He pulled away from me and 
when he turned back around he punched me in the stomach. I was so surprised that l just 
stood there. The bar was so crowded that I don't think anyone even saw what had 
happened. Then he start'ed yelling at me, things like, "I don't dance with dumb bitches" 
and "Keep your hands off me, you whore". Then he just started hitting me over and over 
again. I backed away and put my anns up, but I couldn't go very far, there were too 
many people for me to get away from him quickly. At some point I fell to the ground and 
the crowd sort of gathered around me and just watched him hitting and kicking me. 
Some girl got hit in the process of trying to get in the way of his punches. Eventually I 
blacked out and don't remember anything until I woke up in the emergency room at the 
hospital. 
P: Did Mr. Smith use a weapon of any sort, other than his fist when he was hitting you? 
jG: J don't know. I remember that he had a drink in his hand and I was told at the 
hospital that they pulled glass out of.my arms, but I'm not sure if he hit me with the glass, 
or if there was just glass on the floor when I fell or what. 
P: \Vhat injuries were you treated for at the hospital? 
,JG: I had two broken ribs, a broken finger, a broken nose, a concussion, and many cuts 
and bruises. 
P: Did you receive any stitches for the cuts? 
JG: Yes. All together I got 150 stitches in my face, neck, head, and anns. 
P: Als. Grear, why do you think Afr. Smith attacked you? 
JG: I'm not sure. Everything seemed fine and then all of a sudden he just lost it From 
the things he was yelling at me, I would say that I was attacked because he hates women. 
P: Iv.ts. Grer,.r, doyou thlnk this was a ltate crime? 
JG: Yes, definitely. 
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P: Thank you A1s .. Grear. No further questions. 
Defense Cross Examination of Ms. Grear 
D: Ms. Grear, would you say that you were "hitting on" Mr. Smith at this bar? 
JG: No. I mean, I thought he was attractive and I was curious if he was interested or 
not? but I didn't ask for his number or.ask him out for a date or anything like that. 
D: But you did ask him to slow dance with you? 
JG: Yes. 
D: When yo11 were speaking with Mr. Smith before asking him to dance did you touch 
him in any way? 
JG: I suppose I probably touched his arm when I was talking to him. It was loud in the 
bar with the music and everything so we had to stand very close to cany on a 
conversation. 
D: Did Mr. Smith touch you at all during this conversation? 
QJG: I don't remember. 
D: \.Vhat was your intention in speaking with Mr. Smith and. asking him to dance? 
· JG: I guess to find out if he was interested in me or not. 
D~ Interested how? Sexually? 
JG: Romantically maybe, but not sexually. For a possible date. I wasn't trying to take . 
anyone home "With me that night. 
D: Couldn't you have just asked him if he was interested from the start of the 
conversation? 
JG: I suppose, that just seems a little awkward. 
D: Ms. Grear hav · JOU approached men in bars before? 
JG: Yes. 
D: And how have these men responded to your advances? 
JG: Depends; Sometimes I get a date. Sometimes they say "no thank you". Sometimes 
they get upset and tell me to "fuck-off". 
90 
D: So you haven't always been met with approval in these types of settings? 
JG: No. But I don't think anyone always is. 
D: You testified that at some point you passed out and don't remember anything after 
thnt, correct? 
JG: Yes. 
D: Is it possible that someone other than my client may have attacked you? 
JG: I only saw Mr. Smith hit me. 
D: What about after you passed out? . 
. JG: r guess it's possible. 
D: Thank you. No further questions. 
Prosecution Direct Examination of Witness #1: Mr. Alan Davis - Bartender 
P: Mr. Davis, were you working at the ********on the night of May 29th, 2004? 
AD: Yes, I was tending bar at the South entrance. 
P: Can you tell me if you recognize the victim, Ms. Grear and defendant, }Jr. Smith 
from that evening? 
AD: Yes. I remember both quite well. 
P: Can you tell the court what you saw happen that night? 
AD: Well, I didn't notice them talking or anything until they ordered drinks from me, 
!vis. Grear is actually the one who ordered both drinks. After that I didn't pay much 
attention to them, other than to notice that they were talkjng. A while later I heard A1r. 
Smith yelling at Ms. Grear. At first I assumed they were a couple having a fight and then 
I saw Mr. Smith punching Ms. Grear. I immediately called for bouncers to come break it 
up and tried to get around the bar to he]p Ms. Grear who was lying on the floor by 1:ow. 
I saw Mr. Smith punch.and kick her repeatedly. I saw some girl in the crowd try to break 
it up and she got hit as well. By the time the bouncers got through the crowd it was 
obvious that Jvfs. Grear was not conscious so I called the runbulance right av,ay. Then I 
helped try to clear the crowd out and waited near Ms. Grear until the EMTs arrived. 
P: Did you hear anything that was said between Mr;. Grear and the defendant? 
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AD; I only heard wh~t Mr. Smith was yelling. 
P~ What did you hear Mr. Smith yell? 
AD: He calJed Jvfs. Grear a dumb bitch and told her to keep her hands off him. 
P: Did you see anyone else hit or kick Ms. Grear? 
AD: No, not that I could tell through the crowd. 
P: Did you see Ms. Grear hit lo.Jr. Smith in an attempt to fight back or otherwise? 
AD: No. 
P: Thank you Mr. Davis. 
Defense Cross Examimation of \Vitncss #1 ~ Mr .. Alan J)avis - Bartender 
D: Mr. Davis, how long have you worked at the****~***? 
AD: Three years; 
D: Have you seen many fights in your bar in those three years? 
AD: I guess so. Fights occurl'd say about once every couple of weeks. 
D: Anyone ever taken to the hospital? 
AD: Yes ... it's our policy to call an ambulance if there is any biood or if anyone is 
unconscious. 
D: Did you hear the conversation between Ms. Grear and my client, Afr. Smith? 
AD: No, I didn't hear anything they were talking about until A1r. Smith starting yelling 
obscenities at Ms. Grear. 
D: Thank you Mr. Davis. No further questions. 
Prosecution Direct Examination of Witne;Ss #2: Ms. Isabel Salva 
P: Ms. Salva, were you at the******** the night of May 29th, 2004? 
IS: Yes. 
P: Did you see Ms. Grear and the defendant there that night? 
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IS: Yes I did. 
P: Can you tell the court what you saw relevant to these proceedings that evening'? 
IS: I was standing at the bar near A1r. Smith most of the evening. I saw Ms. Grear come 
over and start talking to him. Then he started to yell at her. I got kind of nervous 
because I was standing so close that I couldn,t move out of the way when he sort of 
shoved her. Then Mr. Smithjust started hitting and kirking her. After she fell to the 
ground, I could see she was bleeding ,md no one was trying to help, so I stepped in the 
way of Mr. Smith and tried to get him to stop. I kept telling him "it's not worth h, you'll 
get atTested". But th~n he hit me and kept kicking Mr,. Grear. 
P: Did you sustain any injuries as a result of trying to help Nls. Grear? 
IS: Y cs, I had a cut above my eye that I had to get stitches for at the hospital. 
P~ Did you see anyone else hit or kick Ms. Grear? 
IS: No. 
P: Why do you· think Mr. Smith was attacking A1s. Grear? 
IS: Because he obviously hates women. 
P: What made you think that was the reason? 
IS: Because of what he was yelling at her. He kept calling her a dumb bltch and saying 
things like "only sluts hit on strangers in bars'~. 
P: }tlfs. Salva, would you consider this to be a hate crime? 
IS: Yes. 
P: Thank you, no further questions. 
Defense Cross Examination of Witness #2: Ms. Isa be: Salva 
D: Ms. Salva, you testified that you had been at the bar for a while that night, correct? 
IS: Yes. 
D: Were you drinking alcohol at the bar that night? 
IS~ Yes. I had a few drinks. 
D: Would you say you were intoxicated at the time the fight broke out? 
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IS: Um, probably. They wouldn't let me drive home from the hospital because I was 
over the legal limit. 
D: Did you hear .!'vis. Grear ask my client to Janee? 
IS: No. But I did hear her ask Mr. Smith if she could buy him a drink. 
D: I-Iow would you describr;; my client's behavior after the fight broke out? 
IS: It was scary. Like he didn't even see or hear me when I was trying to talk to him. 
He just kept hitting and kicking1 like he was·in a trance or something. He seemed very 
angry. 
D: Thank you Ms. Salva. 
Defense Direct Examina~.ion of Defendant: Mr. Smitlt 
D: lvfr. Smith, can yoa please tell the court in your own words what happened the night 
of May 29t11, 2004 at the******** in Minneapolis? 
DS: Yes. I went out with a couple of friends to a different club at first, they were trying 
to set me up with this chic, but I wasn't interested so we left. When we zot to the 
******** I had already had a few drinks, we were just having a good time. Then this 
woman comes up to me and asks if she can buy me a drink. I noticed earlier that she was 
with a couple of other cute girls so I thought maybe one of them was interested nnd sent 
their friend over to talk to me. So she starts asking me all these questions about myself 
then she starts touching my ann and leaning in closer to talk to me. I started to get a little 
uncomfortable so I backed up next to the bar a bit. Then she asks me to dance to a slow 
song and I realizecl that she was hitting on me I Well I told her that I don't dance with 
people I don't know and I guess I mnst of hit her when I turned around. But she Rt ill 
wouldn't leave. She was completely freaking me out. I thought she was going to grab 
me and try to kiss me or something and then I just lost it. I mean she obviously wouldn't 
take "no'' for an answer. 
D: What happened then? 
DS: I don't remember. I just flipped out and I can kind of remember yelling and then 
when the bouncers grabbed me l remember seeing her lying on the ground ... but all the 
stuff in between was just anger. I just wanted her to leave me alone. 
D: Why didn't you just tell her you weren't interested? 
DS: I did. I told her to get her hands off me, but she still wouldn't leave. 
D: Did you intend to harm Ms. Grear? 
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DS: No, I just felt freaked out and wanted her to go away. 
D: Do you remember hitting Ms. Salva? 
OS: No. I don't remember seeing her there at all. 
D: Were y0u surprised that Ms. Grear asked you to dance? 
DS: Hell yeah. I thought she had come over to talk to me about one of her friends. 
D: Thank you Mr. Smith, no further questions. 
Prosecution Cros$ Examination of Defendant: Mr. Smith 
P: Mr. Smith you sftid that you had already had a couple of drinks before you got to the 
***H 1~**, correct? 
DS: Yes. 
{>: Did you have too much to drink that night? 
DS: I don't know, I mean I wasn't wasted or anything. 
P: You testified that you don't remember part of the evening. Did you black out? 
DS: I guess so. 
P: If you don't think you had too much to drink, what do you think caused you to black 
out? 
DS: I'm not sure, I was pretty pissed off, maybe I was just too angry. 
P: Do you hate women? 
DS: No. I don't hate them. I've had plenty of gir/fr;ends. I just don't like it when 
people try to push themselves on you when you're not interested. 
P: Did you feel that Ms. Grear was pushing herself on you that evening? 
DS: Yes. She was hitting on me. 
P: And this made you angry? 
DS: Well, more like freaked out. 
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P: But you blacked out because you were angry? 
DS: When she hit on me I was freaked out, but when she wouldn't leave me alone, I got 
angry. 
P: I see. Mr. Smith you said that you were at a differentbar earlier where you were not 
intereste<l in someone else. Did this person freak you out as well? 
DS: No. 
P: So you didn't get angry at her and hit her ? 
DS: No. 
P: Why didn't she scare you? 
DS: Because she wasn't forcing herself on me. 
P: After Ms. Grear fell to the floor and became unconscious why did you continue to hit 
her? 
DS: I don't remember doing that. 
P.: Mr .. Smith do you think this was a hate crime? 
DS: No way, I don 'thate women. 
P: Than..'t< you. No further questions. 
Defense Direct Examination of Witness #3: Mr. Afox Harr!s - Friend 
D: Mr. Harris, can you please tell us how you know the defendant? 
AH:Dan.and I are good friends. We've known each other for about four years. 
D: Were you out with Mr. Smith the night of May 2911'? 
AH: Yes. 
D: Did you see him talking with M~'. Grear? 
AH: Yes. 
D: How would you describe his actions after the fight broke out? 
· AH: I've never seen him like that. He seemed completely freaked out. 
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D: Have you ever seen him in a fight before'} 
AH: No, never. He can always find a reason to walk away. 
D: Why do you think this fight happened? 
AH: I don't know. It had to be something big for him to go off like that. 
D: What kind of person would you characterize Jvfr. Smith to be? 
AH: A good person. He is very caring, loyal, and he loves his family. He's just an all-
around great friend. 
D: Do you think Mr. Smith hates 1-vomen? 
AH: No. 
D: Thank you Mr. Harris. 
Prosecution Cross Examination of Witness #3: Mr. Alex Harris - ·Friend 
P: Mr. Harris, you have known the defendant for four years and he has never been in a 
fight that you know of? 
AH: Nothing bigger than an argument. 
P: You said that he "freaked out", what do you mean by that? 
AH: He just didn't seem like himself, like he was in a rage or something. 
P: To your knowledge has someone ever·made an unwanted sexual advance toward Afr. 
Smith prior to May 29th? 
AH: Yeah, at bars we hang out at all the time. 
P: And how did he react in those situations? 
AH: He seemed fine. He made jokes about it and we sort of teased hfm a little. 
P: He made jokes about it? What kind of jokes? 
AH: Nothing bad, just how he's hot enough to attract any woman. 
P: Was he polite to the person that hit on him then? 
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AH: Yeah. He just said he wasn't interested and the woman left him alone. 
P: Mr. Ha1Tis, why didn't you do anything to stop the attack on 1\t!s. Grear that night? 
AH: At first I didn't know what was happening and I wasn't sure why the figilit had 
started in the first place. After she feJl to the ground I tried to get over to Dan to talk him 
down, but the crO\vd was too full and I couldn't get through. 
P: 'Ibank you. No further quest.ions. 
Prosecutfon ·:Closiug Sb~tcment 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, there is no dispute that Jvlr. Smith violently attacked 
lvfs. Grear the night of May 29°1, 2004. All of the witnesses here, including Mr. Smith's 
o'v'vn friend, sa\v Mm and on'ly him, hit and kick Ms. Grear repeatedly. Ms. Grear 
~.1curred a nm:1ber of injurks and spent a fow days in the hospital as a result of this 
attack. Both Af;. Gn:tzr and two other witnesses testified to the slanderous and 
derogatory remarks that he shouted toward his victim before and during the attack. 
Ladies and gentl~men, this clearly shows intent on the part of }vfr. Smith to inflict harm 
on his victim. After hearing the words that were shouted during the attack, there should 
be no doubt that ivfr. Smith is guilty of assault motivated by bias and according to the 
hate crime .tentencing enhanceme11t act, should be punished accordingly. Thank you for 
your thm;. 
Defense Closing Statement 
Jury members, although others present that evening say they witnessed my client 
attacking lvfs. Grear, he does not remember that at all. Ladies and gentlemen, my client 
was so frightened and eventually angered by the actions of Ms. Grear that he simply 
reacted poorly to a bad situation. My client, Mr. Smith did not intend to harm Ms. Grear. 
His only intention was to defend himself against an unwanted sexual advance. This case 
lacks the intent needed to constitute assault. Furtltermore, iltis case is not a hate crime 
as my client did not seek out M~. Grear because she was female. He simply wanted her 
to leave him alone. I am certain that you will find my client, Mr. Smith not guilty. 
Thank you. 
Judge's Closing Statement 
Members of the jury, you have heard all the argurr.ents presented by both the District 
Attorney and defense lawyer and are now required to come to a decision regarding the 
guilt or innocence of Mr. Smith. 
Jury membe"'.'s are reminded that in order to find Mr. Smith guilty of assault motivated by 
bias or a hate crime, there must be sufficient evidence that there was intent to inflict 
great bodily harm to the victim and that the victim in this case was assaulted because of 
her actual or perceived sex (gender). The State must prove all of the essential elements 
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oft.he crime charged by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The State is not required to 









____ Prefer not to say 
Race: ___ African American/ Black 
Asian American 
___ Caucasion / White 
__ Hispanic 
___ Native American 
Other: ---






___ Prefer not to say 






__ Other/Prefer not to say 
"Home" state (Lr., state in which you have lived most of your lifo): ______ _ 
State you live in now: _________ _ 
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Individual Juror Verdict 
Juror Number: .. __ _ 
On the basis of the evidence, my vote is that Daniel Smith is: 
Guilty of Assault motivated by bias (ltate crime) ______ _ 
Not-guilty ___ _ 
Private Belief Rating Scale 
Juror# 
With this questionnaire, you are being asked to circle the one number that best describes 
your private belief that Daniel Smith should or should not be convicted of assault. You 
are not being asked to state whether you believe there is sufficient evidence to convict in 
a court of law. Rather, it is asking about your personal and private belief. 
Please circle one number that best describes your private belief about whether Daniel 
Smith should or should not be convicted. 
-5 -4 -3 
Certain Daniel Smith 
Should NOT BE 
Convicted 
Juror Number: 
-2 -i 0 
Perceptions 
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Certain Daniel Smith 
SHOULD BE 
Convicted 
Given the following rating scale, please indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with the following statements. 
Strongly 
Disagree 









_. ___ 2. The defendant is solely t9 blame for the events that took place in the bar tht.1.t 
evening. 
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3. The defendant's actions arc not the results of the victim's sex (gender). 
4. The defendant's actions were reasonable. 
5. The victim should know to be more careful about approaching someone 
they do not know in a bar. 
6. The defendant's actions were the result of unwanted advances hy the ·tictim. 
__ 7. The defendant deliberately intended to inflict injury on the victim. 
8. The defendant's actions were under his control. 
9. Tur, defendant was provoked. 
10. The defendant's actions were justified. 
l 1. The victim deserved it. 
12. Any reasonable man would have acted the same as the defendant. 
13. The defendant is mentally unstable. 
__ .14. The victim is mentally unstable. 
15. The defendant committed a hate crime. 
Personal Decision 
Juror# 
1. Please list, as briefly as possible, the reasons for your personal d~;jsion in this case. 
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Appendix G 
Classification Schema; Study 2 
Statements made by participants from the Personal Decision questionnaire were classified 
into six types of arguments used to support their decision in the case. This table provides 
examples of statements made. 
1. Legal Arguments 
Guilty 
"Her violent assault was without question an assault with intent to harm." 
"Self-defense is not a good enough excuse for beating another person 
unconscious." 
Not Guilty 
"Not enough evidence to decide guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 
"Not guilty of a hate crime/bias because she didn't seek him out to injure 
him." 
2. Physical Evidence 
Guilty 
"He should be punished for physically hurting someone else." 
"She used many derogatory terms." 
Not Guilty 
"People yell insulting and derogatory remarks at people all the time, 
especially in bar situations." 
"There isn't enough conclusive evidence that connects her to the crim~. 
Three people witnessed her yelling and assaulting him but with the extent 
of his injuries it couldn't be her.'' 
3. Morality Statements 
Guilty 
"She acted inappropriately." 
"In any case, whether or not she was forcing herself on him, a man should 
not hit a woman, he should be able to control himself." 
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Not Guilty 
"She was frightened and panicked. She did it as a means for him to get 
away from her." 
"He no doubt attacked her. Maybe having a bad week." 
4. Vid im-Related Statements 
Guilty 
"No violence toward a woman that is that extreme should go unpunished. 
She is.far weaker than him." 
"The only thing the man did was touch her arm when she didn't want to be 
touched." 
Not Guilty 
"He was hitting on her in an obscene way." 
"Advances from the girl means she tried to get him so it shouldn't be his 
fault. She is trying to exploit the situation." 
5. Witness and/or Perpetrator CredibiHty 
Guilty 
"Just because he doesn't remember what happened doesn't make him not 
guilty." 
"A number of witnesses saw the incident describing him hitting her." 
Not Guilty 
"Her friend claimed she was a calm, loyal, caring individual." 
"Never attacked a woman before. Maybe he mistook the situation." 
6. Extra-Legal Factors 
Guilty 
"The alcohol influenced his anger." 
"He was at another bar and didn't freak out." 
Not Guilty 
"Both had been drinking." 




Note: This transcript depicts the condition in which participants will read about a same-
sex attack by a man against a gay man that has been labeled "assault motivated by bias or 
a hate crime" and has taken place in a local bar (i.e., not a gay bar) and where 
"provocation" on the part of the victim was present. 
*Details oflocation that will change depending upon condition appear in italics. 
**Details of presence or absence of "provocation" that will change depending upon 
condition appear in ho/ti italics. 
Juclge's Opening Statement 
Judge: Good afternoon. This proceeding is a trial of the defendant, Mr. Daniel Smith, 
\.Yho has been charged with assault motivated by bias or a hate crime perpetrated against 
Mr. James Grear. Mr. Smith is being prosecuted by the District Attorney's office for 
committing assault mofr,/ated by bias or a hate crime against Mr. Grear. Mr. Smith will 
be represented by his lawyer. We will hear.opening statements from the prosecution and 
defense. This wiB be followed by direct examination of the prosecution's witnesses and 
cross examination by the defense. Direct examination of the defense witnesses and cross 
examination of those witnesses by the prosecution will follow. Each wiH give closing 
statements. 
The issue at this trial is whether Mr. Smith committed assault motivated by bias or a hate 
crime againstMr. Grear during the evening of May 29th, 2005 at a do'WiltO\vn · 
Minneapolis,~ bar. The defenda.11t pleaded not guilty. Before the defendant can be 
convicted, the State must prove all the essential elements of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. . The fact that the defendant has been charged with a criminal offense is 
not evidence and must notbe considere<l by you as evidence. 
Assault motivated by bias is defined by this state in the following statute: 
609.221 Great bodily harm. Whoever assaults another with intent to inflict great bodily . 
harm may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more that1 20 years or to payment of a 
fine of not more than $30,000, or both. Plus: 
Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act (28 U.S.C 994) 
Congress enacted a federal complement to state hate crime penalty-enhancement statutes 
in the 1994 crime bill. This provision required the United States Sentencing Commission 
to increase the penalties for crimes in which the victim was selected "because of the 
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actual or perceived race, color, religion~ national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or 
sexual orientation of any person." This measure applies to attacks and vandalism which 
occur in national parks and on federal property. 
609.2231 Assaults motivated by bias. (a) Whoever assaults another because of the 
victim's or another's actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexua! orkntation, 
disability as defined in section 363A.03, age, or national origin may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, 
or both. 
363A.03 Sexunl orientation. "Sexual orientation" means having or being perceived as 
having an. emotional, physical, or sexual attachment to ci.nother person without regard 
to the sex of that person or having or being perceived as having an orientation for such 
attachment, or having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not 
traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or femaleness. "Sexual 
orientation" does not include a physicaJ_ or sexual attachment to children by an adult 
After all evidence has been heard,. you will be required to vote on the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. 
Prosecution's Opening Statement 
Members of the jury, Mr. Grear will tell you how Mr. Srnith assaulted him without 
provocation or apparent regard for anyone in his way. He will also tell you how Mr. 
Smith shouted slanderous and derogatory remarks toward him during this attack. Mr. 
Grear along with two other witnesses at the bar that evening will testify to the horrific 
natu~e of the crime. This, ladies and gentlemen, is a clear case of assault motivated by 
bias. 'T'his crime is a hate crime given the rea'5on Mr. Grear was attacked is because of his 
perceived sexual orientation. 
Defense's Opening Statement 
Members of the jury, my client, Mr. Smith has been charged with assault motivated by 
bias. We wiJ.1 show that there is no evidence whatsoever to find Mr. Smith guilty of a 
hate crime. Instead, we will show that Mr. Smith was merely defending himself against 
the unwanted sexual advances of Mr. Grear and did not intend to cause bodily harm. 
This case does not constitute assault motivated by bias. 
Judge: Prosecution, call your first witness. 
Prosecution: The state calls Mr. James Grear to the stand. 
ProsecuHon Direct Examination of Mr. Grear 
P: Mr. Grear can you tell us in your own words what happened the night of May 29th, 
2005? 
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JG: Yes. Some friends of mine and I dedded to go out, have a few drinks, a little fun, 
nothing too crazy, maybe a little dancing. We went to this place I'd never been to before, 
the********. It was pretty nice when we first got there, we had a drink and my friends 
went out on the dance floor to dance. I de~ided to walk around and see if there were any 
interesting people, you know. Um, then when my friends came back I was pointing out 
this guy that had smiled at me while I was walking around. I said that I thought he was 
pretty cute. My friends encourag1;d me to go talk to him but I was too shy at first. I 
passed by him again late1 on and he smiled and nodded so I said "hi" and just kept 
walking. I wish I would have left at that point. 
P: So what happened next, Mr. Grear? 
JG: I :finally got up the courage to go talk to him. I walked over when he was only 
talking to one other person ... I didn't want to interrupt their conversation so I waited. I 
said "hello" and asked him if I could buy him a drink. He seemed a little surprised at 
first, but then he said "sure". After I introduced myself we talketl about wltat we do for 
a living,for fun, you know, just tryillg to get to know each other, I thought... then a 
slow song Cflme on, one that I really like. 1 put my arm aro11nd him and asked him to 
dance. He pulled away from me and when he turned backaround he punched me in the 
stomach. I was so surprised that I just stood there. The bar was so crowded that I don't 
think anyone even saw what had happened. Then he started yelling at me, things like, "I 
don'tdance with fags" and "Keep your queer hands off me) you homo". Then he just 
started hitting me over and over again. I backed away and put my rums up, but I couldn't 
go very far, there were too many people for me to get away from him qtlickly. At some 
point I fell to the ground and the crowd sort of gathered around me anct just watched him 
hitting and kicking me. Some girl got hit in the process of trying to get in the way of his 
punches. Eventually I blacked out and don't remember anything until I woke up in the 
emergency room at the hospital. 
P: Did Mr. Smith use 3. weapon of any sort, other than his fist when he was hitting you? 
JG: I don't Jr.now. I remember that he had a drink in his hand and I was told at the 
hospital that they pulled glass out of my arms, but I'm not sure if he hit me with the glass, 
or if there was just glass on the floor when I fell or what. 
P: What injuries were you treated for at the hospital? 
JG: I had two broken ribs, a broken finger, a broken nose, a concussion, and many cuts 
and bruises. 
P: Did you receive any stitche~ for the cuts? 
.JG: Yes. All together I got 150 stitches in my face, neck, head, and arms. 
P: .Mr. Grear, why do you think Mr. Smith attackeu you? 
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JG: I'm not sure. Everything seemed fine and then all of a sudden he just lost it. Prom 
the things he was yelling at me, I would say that I was attacked because I am a gay man. 
P: Mr. Grear, do you think this was a hate crime? 
JG: Yes, definitely. 
P: Thank you Mr. Grear. No further questions. 
Defense Crvss Examination of Mr. Gr-ear 
D: Mr. Grear, you just testified that you are a gay man. Was the bar you were at 
considered a gay bar? 
JG: No, I guess not. 
D= Would you say that you were "hitting on" Mr. Smith at this bar? 
JG: No. I mean, I tJ10ught he was attractive and I was curious ifhe was interested or 
not, but I didn't ask for his number or ask him out for a date or anything like that. 
D: But you did ask him to slow dance with you? 
JG: Yes. 
D: When you were speaking with Mr. Smith before 'lsking him to dance did you touch 
him in any way? 
JG: I put my arm around l,im before I asked him to dance. It was loud in the bar with 
the music and everything so we had to stand very close to carry on a conversation. 
D: Did Mr. Smith touch you at all during this conversation? 
JG: I don't remember. 
D: ·what was your intention in speaking with Mr. Smith and asking ldm to dance? 
JG: I guess to find out if he was interested in me or not. 
D: Interested how? Sexually? 
JG: Romantically maybe, but not sexually. For a possible date. I wnsn 't trying 10 take 
anyone home with me that night. 
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D: Couldn't you have just asktd him if he was interested frorn the start of the 
conversation? 
JG: I suppose, that just seems a little awkward. 
D: Mr. Grear have you approached men in bars that you know to not be co11sidered gay 
bars before? 
JG: Yes. 
D: And how have these men responded to your advances? 
JG: Depends. Sometimes 1 get a date. Sometimes they say ''no thank you". Sometimes 
they get upset and tell me to "fuck-off". 
D: So you haven't always been met with approval in these types of settings? 
JG: No. But J don't think anyone alway.~ is. 
D: Isn't it a greater risk to you knowing that the person you're hitting on may not be 
gay? 
JG: I don't think it makes a difference. If you're not interested, you're not interested~ 
regardless of sexual orientation. It's a risk everyone takes if they're trying to find out if 
someone's interested in them or not. 
D: You testified that at some point you passed out and don't remember anything after 
that, correct? 
JG: Yes. 
D: Is it possible that someone other than my dient rr. ,~y have attacked you? 
JG: I only saw Mr. Smith hit me. 
D: \Vhat about after you passed out? 
JG: I guess it's possible. 
D: Thank you. No further questions. 
Prosecution Direct Examination of Witness #1: M»·. Aian navis - Bartender 
P: Mr. Dav;s~ were you working at the ********on the night of May 29tl', 2005? 
AD: Yes, I was tending bar at the South ent~ ance. 
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P: Can you tell me if you recognize the victim, Mr. Grear and defendant, Mr. Smith 
from that evening? 
AD~ Yes. I remember both quite well. 
P: Can you tell the cou..rt what you saw happen that night? 
AD: Well, I didn't notice them talking or anything until they ordered drinks from me, 
Mr. Grear is actually the one who ordered both drinks. After that I didn't pay much 
attention to them, other than to notice that they wer(i talking. A while later I heard Mr. 
Smith yelling at Mr. Grear. At first I assumed they were a couple having a fight and then 
I saw Mr. Smith punching Mr. Grear. I immediately called for bouncers to come bre~.k it 
up and tried to get around the bar to help Mr. Grear who was lying on the floor by now. I 
saw Mr. Smith punch and kick him repeatedly. I saw somegfrl in the crowd try to break 
it up and she got hit as well. By the time the bouncers got through the crowd h was 
obvicnm thatMr. Grear wns not conscious so J cal\ ·, the ambulance right away. Then I 
helped try to clear the crowd out and waited near Mr. Grear until the EMTs arrived. 
P: Did you hear anything thatwas said between Mr. Grear and the defen~ant? 
AD: I only heard what Mr; Smith was yelling. 
P: What did you hear Mr. SmJth yell? 
AD: He called Mr. Grear a fag and to1d him to keep his queer hands cffhim. 
P: Did you see anyone else hit or kick Mr. Grear? 
AD: No, not that I could tell through the crowd. 
P: Did you see Mr. Grear hit Mr. Smith in an attempt to fight back or otherwise? 
AD: No. 
P: Thank you Mr. Davis. 
Defense Cross Examination nf \Vitness #1 ~ Mr. Alan Davis - Bartender 
D: Mr. Davis, how long have you worked at the********? 
AD: Three years. 
D: Have you seen many fights ~n your bar in those three years? 
AD: I guesr, so. Fights occur I'd say about once every couple nf weeks. 
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D: Anyone ever taken to the hospital? 
AD: Yes ... it's our policy to call an ambulance if there is any blood c;r if anyone is 
unconscious. 
D: Did you hear the conversation bt~tween 1'.fr. Grear and my client, J\.1r. Smith? 
AD: No, I didn't hear anything they were talking about : .. :.~til Mr. Smith starting yelling 
obscenities at Mr. Grear. 
D: Thank you Mr. Davis. No further questions. 
Prosecutfo~,. Direct Examination of Witness #2: Ms. Isabel Salva 
P~ Ms. Salva., were you at the **** 0 ** the night of May 291h, 2005? 
18: Yes. 
P: Did you see Mr. Grear and the defendant there that night? 
IS: Yes J. did. 
P: Can you tell the court what you sav1 relevant to these proceedh~gs that evening? 
.IS: I was standing at the bar near Mr. Smith most of the evening. I saw Mr. Grear come 
over ai,d start taJ.king to him.. Then he started to yell at him. · I got ldnd of nervous 
because I was standing so close that I couldn't move out of the way when he sort of 
shove<i h~m. Then Mr. Smiihjust <.:tarting hittirrg anci kicking him. After he fell to the 
ground, I could see he was bleeding and no one was trying to help, so I stepped in the 
\vay of IV1r. Smith and tried to get him to stop. I kept telling him '"it's not worth it, you'll 
get arrested". But then he hit me and kept kicking Mr. Grear. 
P: Did you sustain any injuries as a result of try::ng to help Mr. Grear? 
{S: Y i.:!s, I h!\d a cut above my e~,c that I hct.d to get stitches for at the hospital. 
P: Uid yo i.~ see an.yor1e else hit or kick Mr. Grear? 
IS: No. 
P: Wby do you think Mr. Smith was attacking Mr. Grear? 
lS: Because he's gay. 
P: What mt1dc you think that was the reason? 
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IS: Bec;ause of what he was yelling at him. He kept caJling him a fag and a queer and 
stuff like that. 
P: Ms. Salva, would consider ihis to be a hate crime? 
IS: Y~s. 
P: Th~mk you, no further questions. 
Defense Cross Examination of 'Witil.ess #2: Ms. Isabel Salva 
D: Ms. Salwi, you testified that you hari been at the bm.· for a while that night, correct? 
lS: Yes. 
D: Were you Jriflking alcohol at the bm· '.hat night? 
IS: Yes. P· .i a few drinks. 
D: Would you say ycu were intoxicated at the time the fight broke out? 
IS: Um, probably. They wouldn't let me drive home frcm the hospital becalise I was 
over the legal limit. 
D~ Did you bear Mr. Grear ask my client to <lane~? 
IS: No. But I dict htar him a~k Mr. Smith ifhe could ·i,uy him a drink. 
D: Ho\v would you describe my cH~nt's behavior after the fight broke out? 
IS: It was scary. Like he didn't even see or hear me when I was trying to talk to him. 
He just kept hitting amt kicking, like he wan in a trance or something. He ~wemed very 
angry. 
D: Thank you Ms. Salva~ 
Defense Dire~t Examinutfon of.Defendant: Mr. Smith 
D: Mr. Smith, C::\tl you please tell the court in your own words what happenedthe night 
of May 29th, 2005 at the******** in Minneapolis? 
DS: Yes. I went out with a couple of friends to a different club at first~ t11ey were trying 
to set me up with !his chic, but I wasn't interested so we left. \\Then we got to the 
******** I had already had a few drinks, we were just having a good time. Then this 
man comes up to me and asks if he can buy me a drink. I noticed earlier that he ,,vas with 
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a couple of cute girls so I thought maybe one of them was interested and sent their friend 
over to talk to me. So he starts a.'aking me all these questions about myself tlten. he 
starts touching my arm and leaning in clm;er to talk to me. I started to get a ltttk 
uncomfortable so I back,:d up next to the bar a bit. The11 he pu! !tis arm otound me am/ 
asked me to dance to a slow song am! 1 realhed tlrut he was hitting on me! Well I>m no 
fag, so I told i1im that and I guess I must of hit him when I turned around. But he still 
wouldn't leave. He W?5 completely freaking me out. I tho1Jght he was going to grab me 
and try to kiss me or something and then I just lost it. I mean he obviously wouldn't take 
"no" for an answer. 
D: Whathappenedthen? 
DS: I don't rem~Lober. I just flipped out and I can kind of remember yelling and then 
when the b0uncers grabbed me I remember seeing rum lying on the ground ... but all the 
stuff in be&·"'.:~n w, 3 just anger. I just wanted him to leave :-w~ alon~. 
D~ Why didn't you jm!' .. ..,d him you weren't interested? 
DS: I did. I told him to get his hands off me, but he still wouidn 't leave. 
D: Did you intend to harm Mr. Grear? 
DS: No, I just felt scared and wanted him to go away. 
D: Do you remember hitting Ms. Salva? 
DS: No. I don't remember seeing her there at all. 
D: Were you s1tJrprised tltat Mr. Grear asked you io da11ce? 
DS: Hell yeah. We weren't in a gay bar or anything ... maybe tfwe were Iwouid've 
t·xpected it ur something, but I thought he wu., asking me questions for one of his frltnds; 
D: Thank you Mr. Smith, no further questions. 
Pros~cution Cross Examination of Defendant: Mr. Smith 
P: Mr. Smith you said that :10u had already had a couple of drinks before you got to the 
*******\ correct? 
DS: Yes. 
P: Did you have too much to drink th?.t nip.ht? 
DS: No. I wasn't wasted or nnything. 
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P: You testified that you don't remember part of the e'1ening. Did you black out? 
DS: I guess so. 
P: If you don't think you had too much tu drjnk, what do you think caused you to biack 
out? 
DS: I'm not sure, I W8.s pretty pissed off, maybe l was just too angry. 
P: Do you hate gay men? 
DS: No. I don't hate them. I don't agree \Vith their lifestyle, but as long as they don't 
-push it on me, they' re fine. 
P: Did you feel that Mr. Grear was pushing his Hlifestyle" on you that evenjng? 
DS: Y cs. He was hitting on me. 
P: And this made you angry? 
DS: Well, more like scared. 
P: But you blacked out because you were angry? 
DS: When he hit on me I was scared, but when he wouldn't leave me alone, I got angry. 
P: I see. Mr. Smith you said that you were at a different bar earlier where you were not 
intoresi:ed in someone e]se. Did this person scare you as well? 
DS: No. 
P: So you didn't get angry at her and hit her? 
DS: No. 
P: 'Nhy didn't she scare you? 
DS! Because she was a woman ... not a gay guy. 
P: After Mr. Grear fell to the floor and became unconscious why did you continue to hit 
hi ? m. 
DS: I don't remember doing that. 
P: Do you consider yourself to be homophobic Mr. Smith? 
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DS: No~ I have a couple of friends who are gay . 
. P: But if a gay man hits on you this makes you feel scared? 
DS: Yeah, I just didn't know what to do. 
P: You couldn't think of another way to handle th.e situation other than beating hirn to 
the point of w1consciousness ami later hospit::.lization° 
DS: I alrendy said I don't remember doing that. 
P: Mr. Smith do you think this was a hate crime? 
DS: No way, I don't hate people just because they're different than me, even ifl don't 
agree with what they do. 
P: Thank you, No further questions. 
Defense Direct Examination of Wxtuess #3: Mr. Alex Harris ... Friend 
D: Mr. Harris~ can y011 please tell us how you know the defendant? 
AH: Dan and I are good friends. We've known each other for about four years. 
D: Were you out whh Mr. Smith the night of May 29tn7 
AH: Yes. 
D: Did you see him talking with Mr. Grear? 
AH: Yf:!S. 
D: How would you describe hi3 actions after the fight broke out? 
AH: I've never seen him like that. He seemed completely freaked out. 
D: Have you ever seen him in a fight before? 
AH: No, never. He can always find a reason to walk away. 
D: Why do you think this fight happened? 
AH: I don't know. It had to be something big for him to go off like that 
D: What kind of person would you characterize Mr. Smith to be? 
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AH~ A good pr,rson. He is very caring, loyal, and he loves his family. He's just an all .. 
around great friend. 
D: Would you consider Mr. Smith l, ~, be homophobic? 
AH: No. I've never heard him say a bad thing about homosexuals. 
D: Thank you Mr. Hanis. 
Pros£cution C~·os:;; Examination of Witness #3: 1\ilr. Alex Harris - Friend 
.P: Mr. Hards, you hzve known the <lefendant for four years and he hali never been in a 
fight that you know of? 
AH: Nothing bigger than an argument. 
P: You said that he ~'freaked out'', what do you mean by that? 
AH: I-fo just didn't seem like himself, like he was in a rage or something. 
P: To your knowledge has Mr. Smith ever been hit on by a member of the same sex prior 
to May 291h? . 
AH: Yeah. at a gay bar we went to with some fem"Je friends once 
P: And how did he react in that situation? 
AH: He seemed fine. He made jokes about jt and w~ so1t of teased him a little. 
P! He made jokes about it? What kind of jokes? 
AH: Nothing bad, just how he's hot enough to attract members of both sexes. Stuff like 
that. 
P: Was he polite to the person that hit on him then? 
AH: Yeah. He just said he was straight and the man left him alone. 
P: IVfr. Smith testified that he disagrees with the lifestyle of gay men and lesbians. Why 
would he go to a gay bar? 
AH: We went for a friend's birthday party. 
P: Mr. Harris, why didn't you do anything to stop the attack on Mr. Grear that night? 
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AH: At first l didn't know what was happening and I wasn't sure why tL':' fight had 
started in the first place. Atlcr he fell to the ground l tried to get over to Dan to talk him 
down, but the crowd was too full and I couldn't get tlu·ougb. 
P: Thank you. No further questions. 
F rosecution Closing Statement 
Ladies and gentlemen ofthejury, there is no dispute that Mr. Smith violently attacked 
1\fl.u. Grear the night of May 29th, 2005. All of the witnesses here, including :Mr. Srruth's 
ovvn friend, saw him and unly him, hit and kick Mr. Grear repeatedly. Mr. Grear incurred 
a number of i~iuries and spent a few days in the hospital as a result of this attack. Both 
Mr. Grear and two other witnes.3es testified to the slanderous and derogatory remarks that 
be s>,outed toward his victim before and during the attack. Ladies and gentlemen, Hus 
clearly shows intent on the part of Mr. Smith to inflict harm on his victim. After hearing 
the words that were shouted during the atiack, there should be no doubt that Mr. Smifa is 
guilty of assault motivated by bias and according to the hate crime sentencing 
enhancement act, should be punished accordingly. Thank you for your time. 
Defense Closi:ng Statement 
J wy members, although others present that eveniA1.g say they witnessed my <.;lient 
attac1'ing Mr~ Grear, he does not remember that at al1. Ladies and gentlemen, my client 
was so frighten.ed and eventually angered by the actinns of Mr. Grear that he simply 
reacted poorly to a bad situation. My client, Mr. Smic:1 did not intend to harm Mr. Grear. 
His only intention was to defend himself against the sexual advances of a gay man. This 
case lacks the intent neederl to constitute ass.:1.ult. Furthermore, this case is not a hate 
crime as my clie~1t did not seek out Mr. Grear because he was gay. He simply wanted 
hi11 ... to leave him alone. I am certain that you will find my client, Ivfr. Smith not guilty. 
Thank you. 
Judge~s Closing Statement 
Members of the jmy, you have heard all the arguments presented by both the District 
A ttorr:ey and defense lawyer and are now required to come to a decision regarding the 
guilt or innocence of Mr. Smith. 
Jury members are reminded that in order to find Mr. Smith guilty of assault motivated by 
bias or a hate crime, there must be sufficient evidence that there was intent to inflict gre~t 
bodily hann to the victim and that the victim in this case w::is assaulted because of his 
actual or perceived sexual orientation. The State must prove all of ~he essential elemerits 
of the crime charged by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The State is not required to 









___ Prefer not to say 
Race: African American / Black 
Asian American 
Caucasion / White 
__ . Hispanic 
Native American 
Other: -- -
___ Prefer n0t to say 





__ Prefer not to say 






__ Other/Prefer not to say 
"Home" sta?·e (Le., state in which you have lived most of your lifo): ________ _ 
State you live in now: 
118 
Individual Juror Verdict 
Juror Number: ------
On the basis of the evidence, my vote is that Daniel Smith is: 
Juror f:I. 
Guilty of Assault motivated. by bias (hate crime) 
Not-guilty 
Private Belief Rating Scale 
------
\Vith this questionnaire, you are being asked to circle the one number that best describes 
your private belief that Daniel Smith should or should not be convic.ted of assault. You 
are not being asked to state whether you believe there is sufficient evidence to convict in 
a court of Jaw. Rather, it is asking about your personal and pri'",a.tc bdicf. 
Please circle one number that best describes your private belief about whether Daniel 
Smith should or should not be convicted. 
-5 -4 " -j 
Certain Daniel Smith 
Should NOT BE 
Convicted 
.! urc .. Number: ------
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
Perceptions 
+3 +4 +5 
Certain Daniel Smith 
SHOULD BE 
Convicted 
Given the following rating scale, ple:ase indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with the follO\ving statements. 
Strongly 
Disagree 













3. The defendant's actions are not the result.s of the victim's sexual orientation. 
4. The defendant's actions were rea~onable. 
____ 5. The victim should know to be more careful about approaching someone 
whose :;exual orientation is unknown. 
6. The defendant's actions were the r~sult of unwanted advances by the victim. 
7. The defendant deliberately intended to inflict injury on the victim. 
8. The defendant's actions were under his control. 
-·- 9. The defendant was prov0ked. 
10. The defendant's actions were justified. 
11. The vidim deserved it. 
12. Any reasonable man would have acted the same as the defendant. 
13. 'The defendant is mentally unstable. 
__ 14. The victim is mentally unstable. 
15. The defendant committed a hate crime. 
Personal Decision 
Juror# ----
1. Please list, as briefly as possible, the reasons for your personal decision in this case. 
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Appeudix·J 
Classification Schema; Study 3 
Statements made by participants from the Persvnal Decision que5tionnaire 1Nere classifie0. 
into six types of arguments used to support their decision in the case. This table provides 
examples of statements made. 
1. Legal Arguments 
Guilty 
"He obviously attacked him with intent to severely hurt hlm~" 
"Not considered self-defense.'' 
Not Guilty 
"He did not seek hi· 11 out and ask him if he was gay, it wasn't his intent to 
hmm." 
"He was being defensive." 
2. Physical Evidence 
Guilty 
"He beat him unconscious while yelling obscenities." 
"He did hit him." 
Not Guilty 
"I think more went on than just words exchanged between them.,, 
3. Morality Statements 
Guilty 
"I don "t think it is right for someone to get hurt bec,qu~~ they were hitting 
on them." 
"You can't just go beat someone because they me gay." 
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4. Victim-Rch1tcd Statement.~ 
Guilty 
· "No one saw the vfotim do anything wrong.,. 
"No harmful actions initiated by -vi<..tim.n 
Not Guilty . 
"He dicJn't feel comfortable with a gay pushing his lifestyle on him. 'When 
he didn't go away, he go~ upset and defensive like any mau would." 
"Tie victim should go to gay bars if he is lonking for men." 
5. Witue~s and/or Perpetrator CredibHity 
Guilty 
HHe could have avoided harming him if h1~ had the ability tc, control 
himself~" 
·'Claiming be didn't hn 1 . ;·.,..., people but his actions showed differently." 
Not Guilty 
"Th~ friend's account of what the defendant is realiy like." 
"I-fo had been hit on by gay men before and did not have a )'.)rob I em.,, 
6. Extra-Legal Factors 
Guilty 
"He shouldn't have acted that Nay at a gay bar." 
"The attack was unprovoked." 
Not Guilty 
"It is an awkward situation and he probably had too much to drink." 
"Something must have been (bn~ to p!ovokc such a brutal attack." 
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